Interactive Judicial Federalism: Certified Questions in New York by Kaye, Judith S. & Weissman, Kenneth I.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 69 Issue 2 Article 3 
2000 
Interactive Judicial Federalism: Certified Questions in New York 
Judith S. Kaye 
Kenneth I. Weissman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Judith S. Kaye and Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism: Certified Questions in New York, 
69 Fordham L. Rev. 373 (2000). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol69/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
ARTICLES
INTERACTIVE JUDICIAL FEDERALISM:
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS IN NEW YORK
Judith S. Kaye* & Kenneth L Weissman**
INTRODUCTION
The Court of Appeals of the State of New York is one of forty-five
state high courts empowered to accept inter-jurisdictional certified
questions of state law.1 New York's certification law, which became
effective in 1986, enables the United States Supreme Court, federal
courts of appeals and high courts of other states to send unsettled
questions of New York law to the state Court of Appeals for
authoritative resolution, thereby eliminating the need for those courts
to speculate over the content of New York law necessary to resolve a
pending case.2 Although the procedure was little used at the outset,
certification in New York has become an increasingly important tool
for federal courts seeking to ascertain New York law where the Court
of Appeals has not previously spoken. In the variety of cases in
which it has been used, New York's certification process has allowed
federal courts to obtain prompt, definitive answers to open questions
of New York law, while promoting the development of New York
* Chief Judge of the State of New York and Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of
the State of New York.
* A.B., Dartmouth College, 1993; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1996. We are indebted
to Frances Murray, Court of Appeals Librarian, for her enthusiastic, tireless research
assistance.
1. Alabama, New Jersey, North Carolina and Vermont are the only states that
have not adopted certification procedures. Although Missouri's legislature has
enacted a certification statute, the Missouri Supreme Court held that it violates that
state's constitutional limits on the court's jurisdiction. Grantham v. Mo. Dep't of
Corr., No. 72576, 1990 WL 602159, at *1 (Mo. July 13, 1990). Appendix A provides a
complete list of state certification laws.
2. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 3(b), cl. 9; N.Y. Ct. R § 500.17(a) (N.Y. Ct. App.)
(McKinney 2000).
3. While New York's certification procedure may also be utilized by state
appellate courts of last resort, no state court has yet invoked it, nor has the New York
Court of Appeals certified a question to any other state court. To date, only the
Second and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have certified questions to New
York's high court. Thus, with state-state interaction still on the horizon, this article
will focus on federal-state certification.
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decisional law by the state Court of Appeals, the final arbiter of such
matters.
This Article consists of three segments. The first part tells the story
behind inter-jurisdictional certification, which emerged as a solution
to our nation's long search for an effective method of resolving open
state law questions in federal litigation. Part II discusses the
somewhat briefer, but also arduous, efforts to implement the process
in New York, a saga that should inspire all first-year law students.
Finally, Part III describes and evaluates New York's experience with
certification over the past fifteen years.
I. FEDERAL COURT DETERMINATION OF STATE LAW
Through much of American history, our nation has struggled to
balance the relationship between the independent state and federal
court systems in areas of overlapping jurisdiction.' Prior to 1938,
federal courts could ignore state decisional law on general matters not
"dependent upon local statutes or local usages of a fixed and
permanent operation," even where state law provided the basis for a
cause of action. This is because in Swift v. Tyson,6 the United States
Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of Decision Act7 obligated
federal courts to follow state law only to the extent found in
constitutions, statutes and common law decisions relating to local
matters. Thus, federal courts were free to craft their own common
law in other areas.9
4. See, e.g., George C. Pratt, The State of New York's State-Federal Judicial
Council, 3 Touro L. Rev. 1, 1 (1986) (noting that "in practice our federal and state
courts regularly experience friction at points of overlapping jurisdiction"); Jack B.
Weinstein, Coordination of State and Federal Judicial Systems, 57 St. John's L. Rev. 1,
1 (1982) (describing the state and federal courts as "two independent systems whose
interplay often perplexes the citizen as well as the theorist visualizing the law as an
integrated whole").
5. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842).
6. Id.
7. The Act has survived virtually unchanged since the days of Swift, and now
provides: "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of
the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994).
8. The local matters on which federal courts followed state common law under
Swift fell into four broad categories: property, real estate, taxes and liens; water rights;
municipal corporations; and matters of status, such as marital rights. See Swift, 41 U.S.
at 18-19; 17 James W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 124 App.01[3] (3d ed.
1997).
9. See 17 Moore, supra note 8, § 124.01[1], at 124-30 (Under Swift v. Tyson,
"'state law' did not include state court decisions on matters of commercial and
contract law or general jurisprudence, such as torts, conflicts of law, and damages.").
The Court in Swift reasoned:
In the ordinary use of language, it will hardly be contended [sic] that the
decisions of courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what
the laws are, and are not, of themselves, laws.... The laws of a state are
[Vol. 69
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A. Erie and its Progeny
The Supreme Court hoped that Swift would result in a uniform
national common law by eliminating state-to-state differences in the
federal courts.0 Experience in applying Swift, however, "revealed its
defects, political and social."'" Two such defects were especially
troublesome. First, state courts and federal courts in the same
jurisdiction frequently applied different common law rules, creating
an environment ripe for forum shopping." Second, "a new well of
uncertainties" arose out of "the impossibility of discovering a
satisfactory line of demarcation between the province of general law
and that of local law,"' 3 which determined whether federal courts
were obligated to apply state law.
In its landmark decision Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins," the
Supreme Court overruled Swift, eliminated the federal general
common law and held that, except in matters governed by the federal
Constitution or acts of Congress, federal courts must apply the law of
the state in which the court sits, in both local and general matters,
regardless of whether the law is "declared by its Legislature in a
statute or by its highest court."1 5 Thus, where no federal statutory or
constitutional claim is at issue, 6 federal courts must now apply state
more usually understood to mean the rules and enactments promulgated by
the legislative authority thereof....
41 U.S. at 18.
10. See, ag., Hewlett v. Schadel, 68 F.2d 502, 504 (4th Cir. 1934) (-To hold to the
rule of Swift v. Tyson ... will preserve a uniform body of law upon which those who
do business in other states can depend, and which will inevitably have a unifying
influence on the decisions of the state courts themselves.").
11. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,74 (1938).
12 See id. at 74-75; Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 523-24 (1928) (describing how company
reincorporated in a neighboring state in order to create diversity jurisdiction and
circumvent Kentucky law); Robert H. Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson, 24
A.B.A. J. 609, 613 (1938):
Perhaps the chief beneficiaries of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson were
corporations doing business in a number of states. Such corporations could
claim to be citizens of the state of their charter alone, and so when sued
could remove cases freely to the federal courts on the ground of diversity of
citizenship. When a corporation was the plaintiff, it likewise had an
advantage. A Delaware corporation suing a New York citizen with respect
to a transaction in New York could bring suit there in either the federal or
state court; even though diversity of citizenship existed, the defendant could
not remove, being a citizen and resident of the state where suit was brought.
13. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74.
14. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
15. Id. at 78.
16. Although diversity jurisdiction provides the most frequent occasion for federal
court application of state law, a federal court must also apply state law in other
situations, such as when supplemental jurisdiction exists, or when federal law
incorporates state law. As the Second Circuit noted:
[I]t is the source of the right sued upon, and not the ground on which federal
jurisdiction over the case is founded, which determines the governing law.
2000] 375
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common law as well as statutory and constitutional law to resolve
substantive issues. 17
Although Erie eliminated a strong incentive for forum shopping and
mooted the debate over which laws are general and which local, 8 it
created another thorny problem: how should federal courts ascertain
state law in cases where it is unclear? Identification of state law is
easy only in the presence of an on-point statute or law "declared...
by its highest court in a decision."'9 In all other circumstances, federal
courts must act as "another court of the State"2 and choose from a
variety of sources, including high court dicta1 and lower court
rulings.' The situation is further complicated when these sources are
Thus, the Erie doctrine applies, whatever the ground for federal jurisdiction,
to any issue or claim which has its source in state law. Likewise, the Erie
doctrine is inapplicable to claims or issues created and governed by federal
law, even if the jurisdiction of the federal court rests on diversity of
citizenship.
Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540 n.1 (2d Cir.
1956) (citations omitted).
17. Federal courts still apply federal procedural rules. The seminal Supreme
Court cases dealing with the distinction between substance and procedure in this
context include Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99 (1945).
18. The Court in Erie also hinted that its decision served constitutional principles
of federalism. Erie, 304 U.S. at 80 (noting that the Swift doctrine "invaded rights
which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several States").
19. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78; see also William G. Bassler & Michael Potenza,
Certification Granted: The Practical and Jurisprudential Reasons Why New Jersey
Should Adopt a Certification Procedure, 29 Seton Hall L. Rev. 491, 492 (1998)
("Locating the proper state rule of decision, even in well-developed areas of state law,
can be a difficult task."). The Court in Erie did not address how to decide unsettled
questions of state law, as the only question before the Court was whether state law
governed, not the content of state law. Erie, 304 U.S. at 80.
20. Guar. Trust, 326 U.S. at 108.
21. Federal courts generally are obligated to consider dicta. See Rocky Mountain
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 452 F.2d 603, 603-04 (9th Cir. 1971) ("A federal
court exercising diversity jurisdiction is bound to follow the considered dicta as well as
the holdings of state court decisions."); 1A James W. Moore & Brett A. Ringle,
Moore's Federal Practice § 307[2], at 3068 (2d ed. 1996). This may not be the case,
however, when dicta in a state supreme court opinion contradicts the actual holdings
of intermediate appellate courts. See, e.g., Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 209 F.2d
904, 907 (2d Cir. 1961) (reasserting a previous holding based on opinions of the
California District Courts of Appeal over the dicta of the California Supreme Court,
which the court characterized as "contrary to [California's] apparent legislative policy
[and] overturn[ing], without citation, an unbroken line of decisions of intermediate
appellate courts.., consistent with that policy").
22. Federal courts must follow intermediate state court cases, unless there is
reason to believe that the state's highest court would not follow them. Hicks v.
Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 630 n.3 (1988) (citing West v. AT&T, 311 U.S. 223, 237-38
(1940)); Pentech Int'l, Inc. v. Wall St. Clearing Co., 983 F.2d 441,445-46 (2d Cir. 1993)
(same). Trial court opinions, by contrast, should be considered, but are not binding.
See, e.g., Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Que., Ltd., 843 F.2d 145, 152 n.6 (3d Cir. 1988)
(stating that a New Jersey Superior Court decision, although not binding, was
instructive); MGM Grand Hotel v. Imperial Glass Co., 533 F.2d 486, 489 n.5 (9th Cir.
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in conflict, or when the vitality of older precedents is questioned by
more recent pronouncements, creating uncertainty as to which should
be followed.23 Worse yet, there may be no relevant precedent at all,
requiring the federal court to make an "informed prophecy" of how
the state high court would rule.24
Although a federal court uses the same sources as a state high court
to determine state law, the federal court's task is considerably harder:
"Whereas the highest court of the state can 'quite acceptably ride
along a crest of common sense, avoiding the extensive citation of
authority,' a federal court often must exhaustively dissect each piece
of evidence thought to cast light on what the highest state court would
ultimately decide."'  Matters are further complicated when a forum
state's choice-of-law provisions' direct a federal court to apply the
1976) (stating that an unpublished trial court opinion is not binding, but nonetheless
may be persuasive). For a discussion of federal court deference to lower state court
interpretations of unclear law, as well as deference to the interpretation of state law
by other federal courts, see Craig A. Hoover, Note, Deference to Federal Circuit
Interpretations of Unsettled State Law: Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 1982 Duke
L.J. 704.
23. See, eg., Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 132 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 1998):
[W]hen the state's highest court has cast doubt on the scope or continued
validity of one of its earlier holdings, or when there is some law in the
intermediate state courts, but no definitive holding by the state's highest
tribunal.., a party favored by the lower court decisions or by the weakened
high court holding will seek federal jurisdiction with the knowledge that the
federal courts, unlike the state's highest court, will feel virtually bound to
follow these decisions.
Id. at 132.
24. Perez-Trujillo v. Volvo Car Corp. (Swed.), 137 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 1998)
(quoting Rodriguez-Suris v. Montesinos, 123 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1997)); see also
Anderson v. Nissan Motor Co., 139 F.3d 599, 601 (8th Cir. 1998); Fioretti v. Mass.
Gen. Life Ins. Co., 53 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 1995); Bank of N.Y. v. Amoco Oil
Co., 35 F.3d 643, 650 (2d Cir. 1994); Moores v. Greenberg, 834 F.2d 1105, 1112 (1st
Cir. 1987) (referring to federal courts' duty to make informed prophecy on state
substantive law issues); John R. Brown, Certification-Federalism in Action, 7 Cumb.
L. Rev. 455, 455 (1977) (noting that federal judges were often required to "trade
[their] judicial robes for the garb of prophet"); cf Yohannon v. Keene Corp., 924 F.2d
1255, 1264 (3d Cir. 1991):
[A] federal court sitting in diversity must often take on the mantle of the
soothsayers of old and predict what the supreme court of a particular state
would do if it were presented with the issue that controls the case before the
federal court. Such contemporary predictions are just as chancy a business
as the divination of dreams that heathen kings of ancient biblical lands so
often called upon their counselors to interpret in the stories of the Old
Testament. Like them, in taking on the task, we hope that our prophecy will
find favor in the eyes of the authority that may one day brand it true or false.
25. Henry J. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 142 (1973) (quoting
J. Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13
Wayne L. Rev. 317, 322 (1967)); see also Arthur L Corbin, The Common Law of the
United States, 47 Yale L.J. 1351, 1352 (1938) (noting that federal judges will be
"limited in a way in which the [state] judges are not themselves limited").
26. A federal court sitting in diversity applies the forum state's choice of law rules.
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
20001
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substantive law of another state, which may also be unclear. As Judge
Henry J. Friendly observed in such a situation, "[o]ur principal task, in
this diversity of citizenship case, is to determine what the New York
courts would think the California courts would think on an issue about
which neither has thought."'27
As a result, federal courts were often forced to make educated
guesses about what law a state would apply, with less than satisfactory
results.' Federal judges generally do not have as much experience
with state law as their state counterparts, and because federal litigants
cannot appeal federal prognostications of state law to the appropriate
state high court,29 losing federal litigants are left frustrated 0 and
federal judges embarrassed 31 when state supreme courts later decide
issues to the contrary. Incorrect predictions can also detract from the
27. Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280,281 (2d Cir. 1960).
28. As an inevitable result of their awkward role as seers, federal courts
frequently are incorrect in forecasting state law. See, e.g., Jerome I. Braun, A
Certification Rule for California, 36 Santa Clara L. Rev. 935, 93740 (1996) (discussing
instances where judges have incorrectly guessed at what state law would be when
ruled upon by the highest state court); John B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins,
Interjurisdictional Certification and Choice of Law, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 411, 415 n.11
(1988) (listing cases in which state courts explicitly disagreed with federal courts'
interpretations of state law); Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity
Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1671, 1679-80 (1992)
("[T]he state courts have found fault with a not insignificant number of past 'Erie
guesses' made by the Third Circuit and our district courts.... It is not that Third
Circuit judges are particularly poor prognosticators. All of the circuits have similar
problems in predicting state law accurately." (footnote omitted)); Stella L. Smetanka,
To Predict or to Certify Unresolved Questions of State Law: A Proposal for Federal
Court Certification to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 68 Temp. L. Rev. 725, 729-35
(1995) (examining the Third Circuit's incorrect predictions of state law).
29. See Gerald M. Levin, Note, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification: Beyond
Abstention Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 344, 345
(1963). The forecasts of state law are, however, reviewable de novo by federal
appellate courts. Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991).
30. See Brown, supra note 24, at 456 (noting the "frustration for litigants when the
rule of law [that federal courts] prescribe turns out to be a ticket for one ride only").
31. "It has been awkward-and, to some, not a little embarrassing-when our first
guess turns out to be wrong and the state court makes the second and last guess by
reversing our holding." Brown, supra note 24, at 455; see also R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941) ("In this situation a federal court of equity is
asked to decide an issue by making a tentative answer which may be displaced
tomorrow by a state adjudication. The reign of law is hardly promoted if an
unnecessary ruling of a federal court is... supplanted by a controlling decision of a
state court."); Braun, supra note 28, at 937-39 (reviewing cases in which federal
courts' predictions of state law were incorrect). Despite the difficulties of predicting
state law, some have regarded the process as beneficial by allowing the state and
federal court systems to be "cross-pollinated" as lawyers practicing in both sets of
courts bring ideas from one to the other. See David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 317, 324-26 (1977); Geri J.
Yonover, A Kinder, Gentler Erie: Reining in the Use of Certification, 47 Ark. L. Rev.
305, 338-39 (1994).
[Vol. 69378
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role of the state high court in declaring the law of the state and
hamper orderly development of the law.3
B. Federal Court Abstention
As the Supreme Court made clear, the difficulties created by Erie
did not justify a federal court's declining "to exercise its jurisdiction to
decide a case which is properly brought to it for decision."' The
Court did, however, identify a number of circumstances in which it is
appropriate for federal courts to abstain from deciding a controversy
pending the resolution of open state law questions in state courts. In
these situations, a federal court can "stay its hand until the courts of
the State ... have declared the law of the State... which is applicable
to and controlling in the disposition of [the] appeals."' While
abstaining, federal courts hold the case in abeyance, retain jurisdiction
and direct the parties to proceed through state channels, usually by
seeking a declaratory judgment from the state court on the open state
law issue.35
The Supreme Court's first formal pronouncement of the abstention
doctrine came in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.' In
Pullman, the Court recognized that abstention may be appropriate
where an uncertain question of state law may be resolved in a way
that would eliminate the need to address a federal constitutional issue,
or affect analysis of that issue. The Court subsequently announced
that abstention was also appropriate in several other circumstances,
such as when a federal determination would disrupt complex state
regulatory schemes in situations where aggrieved parties were
provided with "expeditious and adequate" state review, and where
32. Uncertainty is created because a federal court decision involving issues of
state law is binding on the parties to that litigation, but has no stare decisis effect on
future state court litigants. See Brown, supra note 24, at 456; Note, New York's
Certification Procedure.: Was it Worth the Wait?, 63 St. John's L Rev. 539, 542-43
(1989):
[Flederal courts [are placed] in the unenviable position of having to decide
state law-absent a controlling decision of the highest state court-while
lacking the authority to make the decision binding upon anyone but the
instant litigants. Often, this inherent problem is then exacerbated when
other federal courts or foreign state courts, ruling on similar issues, use the
possibly incorrect holding of the first federal court as authority in their
rulings on the same law. This domino effect continues until broken by a
final decision in the highest court of the state whose law is in question.
33. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228,234 (1943).
34. United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483,484-85 (5th Cir. 1964) (en
banc), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964).
35. See Richard B. Lillich & Raymond T. Mundy, Federal Court Certification of
Doubtful State Law Questions, 18 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 888,890 n.22 (1971).
36. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
37. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943).
2000]
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the uncertain state law involves "a matter close to the political
interests of a State. 38
Although abstention allows federal courts to avoid forecasting state
law, the Supreme Court cautioned that it is to be used sparingly.3 9
Furthermore, abstention can be expensive for litigants. When a
federal court abstains, the case effectively is transferred to a state's
trial court, unless an appellate court has original jurisdiction. The
parties must then take the case through the state's appellate courts,
with the intention of litigating it through the court of last resort.4"
This obviously requires time and money.41 The cost is even greater if
the parties litigated the propriety of abstention in the federal system
prior to the state action.42 This delay may, in turn, discourage litigants
from invoking federal jurisdiction where state questions are
involved.43 Thus, it soon became apparent that abstention was not an
effective solution to the problem of federal courts seeking to ascertain
state law.44
38. La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959); see also
Charles A. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts, § 52, at 329-30 (5th ed. 1994)
(discussing abstention in cases involving issues of special interest to the state); 17A
Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4241, at 13-14 (same).
39. See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228,234-35 (1943).
40. Of course, there is no guarantee that the case will make its way to the state's
highest court, and an abstaining federal court, therefore, may be forced to rely on a
lower court's prediction of how the high court would rule. See Martha A. Field, The
Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 590, 604-05 (1977).
41. See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Ariz., 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997)
("Attractive in theory because it placed state-law questions in courts equipped to rule
authoritatively on them, Pullman abstention proved protracted and expensive in
practice, for it entailed a full round of litigation in the state court system before any
resumption of proceedings in federal court."); England v. La. State Bd. of Med.
Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411,418 (1964) (noting the "delay and expense to which application
of the abstention doctrine inevitably gives rise"); Levin, supra note 29, at 346-48
(discussing the cost and delay in bringing a second suit after abstention); Lillich &
Mundy, supra note 35, at 890 ("This authoritative determination of state law.., had
an added price in terms of delay and cost to litigants."); John A. Scanelli, The Case for
Certification, 12 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 627, 632-34 (1971) (discussing the added cost
and delay of bringing a second suit in state court); Memorandum and
Recommendation of the N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n to the 1984 Legislature Relating
to Certification of Questions of Law to the Court of Appeals, at 6 (1984) ("The
expense and delay caused by proceeding through the lower state courts up to the
highest state court to obtain a definitive resolution of state law can make such
abstention an onerous burden on litigants.").
42. Levin, supra note 29, at 346.
43. See id. at 347; see also Comment, Abstention and Certification in Diversity
Suits: "Perfection of Means and Confusion of Goals," 73 Yale L.J. 850, 866 (1964)
(noting that if abstention were to be used regularly, opponents of the doctrine could
"mount a convincing argument that federal judges would be reduced to little more
than sterile monitors shuttling traffic between a dual system of courts at appropriate
stages of the litigation. Litigants would, again, be discouraged from invoking the
diversity jurisdiction as judges felt themselves under greater pressure to invoke the
doctrine, and apparent congressional intent would be, to that extent, disserved.").
44. See, e.g., Comm. on Federal Courts, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, The Abstention
Doctrine: The Consequences of Federal Court Deference to State Court Proceedings,
[Vol. 69
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C. The Birth of Certification
Inter-jurisdictional certification allows a court to obtain
authoritative answers to unsettled questions of state law directly from
that state's highest court. Thus, as with abstention, certification saves
federal courts from the awkwardness of predicting state law, and
allows state high courts to articulate the law without the complication
of potentially contradictory federal decisions on the issue. Unlike
abstention, however, certification does not require litigating a new
lawsuit through state appellate review. Instead, because the question
is sent directly to the state's highest court, certification imposes
neither the cost nor the delay of abstention. 5
In 1945, acting with what the United States Supreme Court termed
"rare foresight,"' the Florida legislature enacted a statute permitting
federal courts to certify unresolved state law questions to the Florida
Supreme Court.47 Florida thus became the first state to offer this
procedural mechanism in lieu of abstention in cases where federal
courts were faced with open state law issues."s When the United
reprinted in 122 F.R.D. 89, 106-07 (1988) (recommending cautious use of abstention
and the need for federal courts to assess carefully whether abstaining "will have the
practical effect of frustrating or unduly delaying the adjudication of federal claims");
Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act of 1967, 12 U.LA. 81, 82 (1996)
(prefatory note) (commenting that abstention "has proved to be quite
unsatisfactory"); Bassler & Potenza, supra note 19, at 493 (referring to abstention as
"a rarely applied and awkward procedural device"); Field, supra note 40, at 605
(arguing that abstention is not worth the costs it imposes on litigants).
45. E.g., Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 76 ("Certification procedure,
in contrast [to abstention], allows a federal court faced with a novel state-law question
to put the question directly to the State's highest court, reducing the delay, cutting the
cost, and increasing the assurance of gaining an authoritative response."); Tunick v.
Safir, 209 F.3d 67, 79 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[T]he delay created by certification is almost
never as great as that imposed by abstention.").
46. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207,212 (1960).
47. The Florida statute authorized the Florida Supreme Court to adopt rules for
receiving certified questions from the United States Supreme Court and federal
courts of appeals when a question of Florida state law was "determinative" and there
were "no clear controlling precedents" from state court decisions. 1945 Fla. Laws, ch.
23098, § 1 (codified at Fla. Stat. § 25.031 (1998)).
48. There had been intra-jurisdictional certification of questions of law in the
United States as far back as 1802, when Congress authorized the circuit courts to
certify questions to the Supreme Court. See Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 6, 2 Stat.
156, 159-61. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes commented that such certification is "a
mode of disposing of cases in the least cumbersome and most expeditious way." Chi.,
Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Williams, 214 U.S. 492, 495-96 (1909) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). The British had established inter-jurisdictional certification procedures in
the British Law Ascertainment Act of 1859, 22 & 23 Vict., ch. 63 (Eng.) (relating to
certification of questions of law to other dominions of Great Britain), and the Foreign
Law Ascertainment Act of 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., ch. II (Eng.) (relating to certification
of questions of law to foreign countries). These Acts were forerunners of certification
laws in the United States. See Ira P. Robbins, The Uniform Certification of Questions
of Law Act A Proposal For Reform, 18 J. Legis. 127, 131-33 (1992); M. Bryan
Schneider, "But Answer Came There None". The Midigan Supreme Court and the
Certified Question of State Law, 41 Wayne L. Rev. 273, 289-90 (1995).
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States Supreme Court praised the statute fifteen years later,4 9
however, the Florida Supreme Court had yet to implement it.50
Despite the apparent advantages of certification, the states were
slow to act. By 1975 only fourteen states had adopted certification
procedures.5 1 This situation changed in the ensuing years, however, as
courts and commentators continued to seek an effective alternative to
abstention. One factor that promoted certification was the staunch
support of the Supreme Court. After praising Florida's statute in Clay
v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd.,"2 the Court gave the procedure a second
pat on the back in the 1974 case Lehman Bros. v. Schein. 3 In that
diversity suit filed in a New York federal court, it was clear that New
York's choice of law rules made Florida law applicable, but the
District Court and Court of Appeals disagreed on how Florida would
resolve the open issue. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the
federal Court of Appeals so that court could consider whether the
controlling issue of Florida law should be certified to the Florida high
court. While not suggesting that certification was obligatory, the
Supreme Court noted that "in the long run [it] save[s] time, energy
and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism."'
Two years later, in Bellotti v. Baird,55 the Court again boosted
certification. At issue was a Massachusetts statute concerning
parental consent before an unmarried woman under eighteen could
have an abortion. A three-judge District Court had declared the
statute unconstitutional and enjoined its operation. On direct appeal,
the Supreme Court, noting that the statute had never been construed
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts-and that the state's
49. A speech given by Professor Philip B. Kurland-a former law clerk to Justice
Frankfurter, author of Clay-shortly before Clay was decided may have planted the
seed for Supreme Court support of certification. In addressing the problems of
abstention, ProfessorKurland stated:
Probably the best solution to the delay problem is the one tendered by the
legislature of the State of Florida which has never been utilized .... The
Florida statute authorizes its high court to receive questions of State law by
certification from a federal appellate court.... With such a certified and
authoritative answer, the federal courts could readily proceed tojudgment.... Here again we could have a demonstration of cooperative
judicial federalism which would justify those of us who think that the federal
form of government has a contribution to make toward the preservation ofjustice in this country.
Philip B. Kurland, Toward a Cooperative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court
Abstention Doctrine, reprinted in 24 F.R.D. 481, 489-90 (1960) (Speech to the
Conference of Chief Justices, Aug. 20, 1959, at Miami Beach, Florida); see also 17A
Wright, supra note 38, § 4248, at 160-61 & n.8 (discussing Kurland's speech).
50. See Clay, 363 U.S. at 212 n.3; In re Fl. Appellate Rules, 127 So. 2d 444, 445
(Fla. 1961) (court rule implementing Florida's certification procedure).
51. Robbins, supra note 48, at 165.
52. 363 U.S. at 212.
53. 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
54. Id. at 390-91.
55. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
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Attorney General interpreted the statute in a way that would not
create a "parental veto"-held that the District Court should have
certified relevant issues of state law to the state's Supreme Judicial
Court. The Supreme Court emphasized that the Massachusetts
court's interpretation of the statute could "avoid or substantially
modify the federal constitutional challenge to the statute," and that in
the absence of an authoritative construction, it would be impossible to
define the constitutional question with precision.' Furthermore,
although the importance of speed in the resolution of the case
weighed against abstention, the Court stated that the availability of
the faster certification procedure "greatly simplifies the analysis.""
More recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its support for
certification in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,58 in which an
Arizona state employee filed a federal constitutional challenge to a
state constitutional provision that made English the state's official
language. Arizona's Attorney General requested that both the
District Court and Court of Appeals ask the Arizona Supreme Court
the meaning of the provision, but the federal courts refused, instead
construing it to prohibit use of any language but English by Arizona's
government officials and declaring the provision unconstitutionally
overbroad. The Supreme Court vacated the lower court judgments on
the ground that the case had become moot after the plaintiff left her
state job.59 Because a limiting construction of the language provision
may have rendered it constitutional, however, the Supreme Court also
stated that the federal courts should have applied a "more cautious
approach," reiterating its earlier assessment that "[t]hrough
certification of novel or unsettled questions of state law for
authoritative answers by a State's highest court, a federal court may
save 'time, energy, and resources and hel[p] build a cooperative
judicial federalism."' 6 The complexity of Arizonans, the Supreme
Court suggested, "might have been avoided had the District Court,
more than eight years ago, accepted the certification suggestion made
by Arizona's Attorney General."6
The Supreme Court itself also has used state certification
procedures. In Fiore v. White,' for example, petitioner owned and
operated a hazardous waste disposal facility in Pennsylvania. He and
the facility's manager, Scarpone, were jointly tried and convicted
under a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the operation of a hazardous
waste storage, treatment or disposal facility without a "permit."' The
56. Id. at 148.
57. Id. at 151.
58. 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
59. Id. at 74-75.
60. Id. at 77 (citation omitted).
61. Id. at 79.
62. 120 S. Ct. 469 (1999).
63. Id. at 470-71; see Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, § 6018.401(a) (Purdon 1993).
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two co-defendants appealed separately to different appellate courts,
and while Scarpone's appeal was successful on the ground that a valid
"permit" existed, Fiore's conviction was affirmed. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court affirmed the decision in Scarpone's case, but refused
to hear Fiore's. After seeking collateral relief in the state courts,
Fiore filed a federal habeas corpus petition, claiming that the state
produced no evidence to establish that he lacked a "permit" in
operating the hazardous waste facility.'
The validity of Fiore's claim depended in part upon whether the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute in
Scarpone's case was the same at the time of Fiore's trial. The District
Court granted Fiore's petition, and the Third Circuit reversed.
Instead of guessing whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
Scarpone decision applied retroactively-a question not addressed by
the Pennsylvania courts-the United States Supreme Court simply
invoked Pennsylvania's certification procedure to "help determine the
proper state-law predicate for our determination of the federal
constitutional questions raised in this case." 65
Supreme Court support for certification has been widely echoed. In
1967, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws adopted the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act.66
The Act-promulgated at a time when only four states had
certification procedures67-was modeled on the Florida rule,68
64. Fiore, 120 S. Ct. at 471-72.
65. Id. at 473. The question certified was "Does the interpretation of Pa. Stat.
Ann., tit. 35, § 6018.401(a) (Purdon 1993), set forth in Commonwealth v. Scarpone,
535 Pa. 273, 279, 634 A.2d 1109, 1112 (1993), state the correct interpretation of the
law of Pennsylvania at the date Fiore's conviction became final?" Id. The question
remains pending before the Pennsylvania high court.
For additional Supreme Court uses of certification, see Virginia v. Am. Booksellers
Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 395-97 (1988) (two questions certified to the Virginia Supreme
Court regarding a state statute making it unlawful to display for a commercial
purpose sexually explicit materials that could be seen and examined by juveniles);
Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 668-69 (1978) (question certified to the Court of
Appeals of Maryland regarding whether certain non-immigrant aliens residing in
Maryland are capable of becoming Maryland domiciliaries and thereby receiving
certain benefits in applying to and paying tuition at the University of Maryland);
Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136, 136-39 (1963) (in order to determine
whether it had jurisdiction, the Court certified two questions to the Supreme Court of
Florida); and Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 75, 75-76 (1963) (the Court certified four
questions to Florida's high court regarding alimony decrees and jurisdictional issues).
Earlier this year, the Supreme Court declined to certify a question regarding
interpretation of Nebraska's partial-birth abortion statute to the Nebraska Supreme
Court, as certification had not been sought by the Attorney General, the statute was
not fairly susceptible to a narrowing construction, and the question would not have
been determinative. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597,2616-17 (2000).
66. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act (1967), 12 U.L.A. 82 (1996). The
Act was revised in July 1995. See Unif. Certification of Questions of Law [Act][Rule]
(1995), 12 U.L.A. 67, 71 (1996).
67. The states were Florida, Maine, Washington and Hawaii. See Unif.
Certification of Questions of Law Act (1967), 12 U.L.A. 82-83 (1996) (prefatory
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allowing for certification of questions from the Supreme Court, circuit
courts of appeals, district courts and appellate courts of other states.69
In 1969, the American Law Institute chimed in with its support," as
did the American Bar Association in 1977.71 In 1992, the National
Conference on State-Federal Judicial Relationships suggested that
certification could enhance judicial federalism,' and in 1995, the
Committee on Long Range Planning of the United States Judicial
Conference recommended that states without certification procedures
adopt them.73
As support grew, so did the number of states to embrace the
procedure. Today, forty-five states, the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico allow their high courts to answer questions about their
note).
6& Id at 82 n.2.
69. Id. at 86. Because of the inter-jurisdictional nature of certification, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws posited that it would
"be eminently desirable that uniformity be achieved in this area." i. at 83. The
Conference predicted that "[u]niformity would make probable the greater use of
certification," as attorneys and judges from around the country would be "faced not
with an unfamiliar act, but rather with a carbon of the act of their own states." Id.
70. The ALI's proposal read:
A court of the United States may certify to the highest court of a State a
question of State law, if (1) the State has established a procedure by which
its highest court may answer questions certified from such court of the
United States; (2) the question of State law may be controlling in the action
and cannot be satisfactorily determined in light of the State authorities; and
(3) the court expressly finds that certification will not cause undue delay or
be prejudicial to the parties.
American Law Institute, Study of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts,
Official Draft § 1371(e) (1969). According to the commentary accompanying this
provision, "a large majority" of the ALl supported certification, as long as
appropriate safeguards were developed "to prevent abuse of that device." Id. at 292
(commentary to subsection (e)).
71. "The rules of the highest state court should provide a procedure whereby a
federal court may request an authoritative statement of state law applicable in a case
pending in the requesting court. The state high court may, but need not, answer the
request for certification." A.B.A., Jud. Admin. Div., Standards Relating to Appellate
Courts § 3.33(c) (1977). The ABA again strongly endorsed certification in 1983, when
its House of Delegates unanimously adopted a resolution encouraging the enactment
of certification legislation in every state. See A.B.A., Special Committee on
Coordination of Fed. Jud. Improvements, Report to the House of Delegates (1983);
Letter from Robert D. Evans, Director, Governmental Affairs Group, American Bar
Association, to Hon. Edward Griffith, Member of the New York Assembly (Mar. 21,
1983) (on file with authors) (noting unanimous ABA House of Delegates support for
certification).
72. See William Schwarzer, "Letter to Our Readers," in FJC Directions: Special
State-Federal Issue (A Distillation of Ideas from the National Conference on State-
Federal Judicial Relationships) 1, 6 (1993).
73. Judicial Conference of the United States, Long Range Plan for the Federal
Courts 32-33 (Dec. 1995); see also Jona Goldschmidt, American Judicature Society,
Studies of the Justice System, Certification of Questions of Law: Federalism in Practice
2 (1995) ("[I]t is hoped that dissemination of this report will improve and facilitate the
certification procedure where it exists, and encourage its adoption where it does
not.").
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law posed by a court in another jurisdiction.74 Thus, after a long
search, inter-jurisdictional certification emerged as a promising
solution to the problem of forecasting state law in federal litigation.
II. THE CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE IN NEW YORK
A. Enactment of New York's Certification Law
New York's adoption of a certification procedure is another
tortuous tale. In 1965, five years after the United States Supreme
Court breathed life into Florida's dormant certification statute,75 New
York's Law Revision Commission (the "Commission") began a study
of the desirability of a constitutional amendment that would allow the
state's high court to answer inter-jurisdictional certified questions of
law.76 After completing the study in 1966, the Commission decided
not to pursue the still novel concept.7
1. Statutory and Constitutional History
As time progressed, however, the concept gained national
prominence. By the early 1980s, a significant number of states had
adopted certification statutes78 and many commentators had voiced
enthusiasm for the procedure. 79 This enthusiasm was shared by John
74. See infra Appendix A; see also Bassler & Potenza, supra note 19, at 495 n.18
(listing forty-five states, in addition to the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, that
have adopted a certification procedure); Goldschmidt, supra note 73, at 15-16 (listing
the forty-three states that had a certification procedure as of that time); Jessica Smith,
Avoiding Prognostication and Promoting Federalism: The Need for an Inter-
Jurisdictional Certification Procedure in North Carolina, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 2123,2129-30
(1999) (noting that North Carolina is only one of four states that have not enacted a
certification procedure).
75. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text (discussing Clay v. Sun Ins.
Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960)).
76. Letter from Michael J. Hutter, Executive Director, New York State Law
Revision Commission, to Joseph W. Bellacosa, Clerk of the New York Court of
Appeals (Nov. 1, 1983).
77. Id.; see also Memorandum of the Law Revision Comm'n Relating to
Certification of Questions of Law to the Court of Appeals (1984), reprinted in 1984
N.Y. Laws 2975, 2975-76; 1969 Report of the N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n 17 (noting
that the Commission had continued for further study its investigation into state
legislation relating to federal court abstention). The 1966 study, entitled Federal
Courts: State Legislation Relating to Abstention When Points of Local Law Must Be
Decided, served as the basis of a law review article five years later. See Lillich &
Mundy, supra note 35, at 888.
78. By 1984, twenty-four states and Puerto Rico had adopted a certification
procedure. Memorandum of the Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 77, at 2977.
79. See, e.g., Kurland, supra note 49 at 489-90 (1960) (commending Florida's
certification statute); Wright, Federal Courts § 52 (4th ed. 1983) (discussing
certification generally); Levin, supra note 29, at 348-50 (noting the simplicity and
efficiency of inter-jurisdictional certification); Lillich & Mundy, supra note 35, at 899
("Certification statutes and rules.., have received the approval of most
commentators who have analyzed them."); Allan D. Vestal, The Certified Question of
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J. Halloran, Jr., who during the 1981-1982 school year was a first-year
student at Albany Law School and part-time Legislative Assistant to
Assemblyman Edward Griffith.' Halloran became interested in
federalism while studying civil procedure, and independent research
led him to material related to certification." After learning that New
York did not have such a procedure, Halloran took the idea to
Assemblyman Griffith, who agreed it was worth pursuing. A bill was
drafted, using the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act as a
model.8
As a result of these efforts, on March 2, 1982, Assemblyman
Griffith proposed the following addition to New York's Judiciary
Law:
Rulemaking power of the court of appeals with respect to matters
before certain federal courts. The court of appeals may adopt and
from time to time amend a rule to permit the court of appeals to
answer questions of law certified to it by the Supreme Court of the
United States. a Court of Appeals of the United States, the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia. or a three judge district court of
the United States. when requested by the certifying court if there are
involved in any proceeding before it questions of law of the state of
New York which may be determinative of the cause then pending in
the cerifinag court and as to which it appears to the certifying court
there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the court of
appeals of New York.'
The legislative declaration accompanying this bill asserted that
"federal court certification of unsettled state law questions fosters the
principles of cooperative judicial federalism and comity upon which
the American judicial system is based."' It noted the "extraordinary
enthusiasm" with which commentators had greeted the procedure,
and concluded that it was "a necessary and proper element of New
York's judicial system" required "to avoid the inherent dangers of
predicting what view the highest state court would take toward a legal
question, and to avoid the added costs in terms of delay and expense
to the litigants when the abstention doctrine is invoked."'
Almost immediately, however, Assemblyman Griffith's bill ran into
an apparent roadblock. On February 24, 1982, Halloran had written
to Joseph W. Bellacosa, then Clerk of the Court of Appeals (later a
Judge of the court), requesting the court's view concerning the
Law, 36 Iowa L. Rev. 629, 645 (1951); Abstention and Certification in Diversity Suits,
supra note 43, at 867-69 (1964) (highlighting the "speed, authority and economy
possible using certification procedures").
80. Interview with John J. Halloran, Jr. (May 12, 2000).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Assemb. 10676,207th Sess., § 53-a (N.Y. 1982).
84. Id. § 1.
85. Id.
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proposed legislation. 6 The March 2, 1982 reply indicated in no
uncertain terms that the court "has previously opposed this kind of
legislation and.., again strongly opposes its enactment."'  The letter
plainly was not Halloran's dream response. It did, however, identify
the court's three objections to the bill, and thus was pivotal in
reshaping future efforts.
The first problem noted by the court was that, although the
legislative declaration stated that the "proposal does not in any way
enlarge or modify the jurisdiction of the court of appeals,"' the bill
presented "a potentially serious constitutional flaw in adding to this
Court's jurisdiction via legislation and rule making rather than by
constitutional amendment."8 9 Article VI, section 3 of the New York
Constitution generally limits the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
to questions of law in particular categories of cases,' none of which
allowed the court to answer an inter-jurisdictional certified question.91
Thus, in the Court of Appeals' view, a statute empowering the court
to answer such questions would have been patently unconstitutional.
Second, the court was of the view that the proposal would require
advisory opinions, an "historically inappropriate and unacceptable"
role.' And third, the court expressed concern that certification would
add to its already overloaded docket.93
86. The purpose of the letter was to "solicit[] any commentary you would care to
offer as to the impact of this legislation upon the Court of Appeals." Letter from John
J. Halloran, Legislative Assistant to Edward Griffith, to Joseph Bellacosa, Chief
Clerk. New York Court of Appeals (Feb. 24, 1982).
87. Letter from Joseph W. Bellacosa, Chief Clerk, New York Court of Appeals, to
John J. Halloran, Legislative Assistant to Assemblyman Edward Griffith (Mar. 2,
1982).
88. Assemb. 10676,207th Sess., § 1 (N.Y. 1982).
89. Letter from Joseph W. Bellacosa, supra note 87.
90. There are three exceptions to this restriction, where the court also may review
facts: when a defendant has been sentenced to death; in certain cases when the
intermediate appellate court has found new facts; and when a judge has requested
that the court review a determination of the Commission on Judicial Conduct. N.Y.
Const. art. VI, §§ 3(a), 22(d).
91. See N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 3(b).
92. Letter from Joseph W. Bellacosa, supra note 87. "The courts of New York do
not issue advisory opinions for the fundamental reason that in this State '[t]he giving
of such opinions is not the exercise of the judicial function."' Cuomo v. Long Island
Lighting Co., 71 N.Y.2d 349, 354 (1988) (quoting Matter of State Indus. Comm'n., 224
N.Y. 13, 16 (1918)). The court was not alone in this concern. Indeed, the opening of
a New York Times article describing the proposed constitutional amendment to allow
certification read "Should New York's highest court be able to give advisory opinions
to out-of-state courts?" Maurice Carroll, New York Ballot to Pose 5 Questions, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 27, 1985, at A54. Likewise, in announcing that the amendment passed,
the New York Law Journal proclaimed that voters had approved a "proposition
allowing the New York Court of Appeals to issue advisory opinions on state law for
federal courts or other state appellate courts." Voters Approve Court Question by Big
Margin, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 7, 1985, at 1.
93. Letter from Joseph W. Bellacosa, supra note 87. The court entertained 722
full appeals in 1982, and 684 in 1983. 1982 Annual Report of the Clerk of the Court to
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Given the Court's opposition and the lack of a core constituency
pressing for certification in New York, the bill seemed dead.
Counseled by Assemblyman Griffith to rethink tactics, however,
Halloran pressed ahead, obtaining support from several key sources,
including the United States Supreme Court, I New York's State-
Federal Judicial Council (then chaired by Court of Appeals Judge
(later Chief Judge) Sol Wachtler)95 and Professor Maurice Rosenberg
of the "MacCrate Commission," which in 1982 had published a highly
regarded study of state appellate courts in New York.'
the Judges of the New York State Court of Appeals, appendix 4; 1983 Annual Report
of the Clerk of the Court to the Judges of the New York State Court of Appeals,
appendix 4. After the court gained greater certiorari jurisdiction in 1986 (see infra
note 123 and accompanying text), the number of appeals became far more
manageable. In 1998, for example, the court heard 198 appeals, and in 1999, the
Court heard 208. 1998 Annual Report of the Clerk of the Court to the Judges of the
New York State Court of Appeals, appendix 3; 1999 Annual Report of the Clerk of
the Court to the Judges of the New York State Court of Appeals, appendix 3. Again,
the court was not alone in its concern over the effects of a certification procedure on
its caseload. For example, a September 1983 report on Assembly Bill 2229 by the
Committee on State Legislation of the New York County Lawyers' Association
recommended disapproval of the bill because of the need for further study "to
establish that the procedure, if implemented in New York State, would not cause
unnecessary delay and increased expense to litigants." N.Y. County Law2yers' Ass'n,
Report on Proposed Legislation Allowing the Court of Appeals to Answer Questions
of Law Certified to it by Specified Federal Courts 5 (Sept. 1983) [hereinafter
N.Y.C.L.A. Report]. The N.Y.C.L.A. Report noted that in the years leading up to
1982 "the caseload of the Court of Appeals has increased in staggering proportions."
Id. at 5. Of all the potential concerns raised about certification, the Association found
none to be "so compelling as that of delay," a problem especially difficult "in a state
with as heavy a caseload as New York," and worried about the practical effect of
certification on New York litigants, given the already strained resources of the Court
of Appeals. Id. at 4-6.
94. Although the Supreme Court declined to express its view about Assemblyman
Griffith's specific proposal, in a letter responding to John Halloran the Court
(through its Clerk) noted that "it is a matter of public knowledge that appellate
judges, generally, favor legislation in the States authorizing the Supreme Court to
certify to the highest court of the State a question of state law on which a Federal
appellate court is called on to act." Press Release, Assemblyman Edward Griffith
(Mar. 14, 1983) (on file with authors). We were unsuccessful in locating the actual
letter from the Supreme Court to Mr. Halloran.
95. Letter from Sol Wachtler, Judge, Court of Appeals of the State of New York,
to Gordon A. Howe, II, Assistant Counsel to the Majority Leader (Apr. 27, 1984); see
also Pratt, supra note 4, at 3-4 (noting that one of the issues discussed by the Council
in 1982 was "the possibility of instituting a procedure for certifying questions of state
law to the New York Court of Appeals," and that institution of such a procedure is a
"substantial achievement-although not one that can be attributed solely to the
efforts of the council"); Steven Flanders, A New Approach Revitalizes State-Federal
Judicial Council, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 4, 1984, at 1 (describing the role of the Council in
persuading the Court of Appeals to support certification). The Advisory Group to
the Council recently produced a handbook on certification for New York
practitioners. See Advisory Group to the State and Federal Judicial Council, Practice
Handbook on Certification of State Law Questions by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit to the New York State Court of Appeals (Feb. 25,
2000).
96. Interview with John J. Halloran, Jr. (May 12, 2000); Robert MaeCrate et al.,
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Simultaneously, as support was generated for certification in New
York, Assemblyman Griffith's bill was redrafted in order to address
the problems identified by the Court of Appeals. To account for the
court's limited jurisdiction, the bill took the form of a constitutional
amendment.' The amendment allowed the Court of Appeals to
adopt rules permitting it to accept certified questions of law from the
Supreme Court, federal Courts of Appeals, the Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia and three-judge federal District Courts,
when those courts were faced with open, potentially dispositive
questions of New York law.98 Shortly thereafter, an identical bill was
introduced in the Senate.9 The bill passed in the Assembly on March
14, 1983 but died in the Senate's Judiciary Committee. 00
In late 1983, Halloran sought support from New York's Law
Revision Commission.10 1 The Commission reopened its earlier study
and agreed to assume primary drafting responsibility."w On January
24, 1984, Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Douglas Barclay
introduced a resolution that paralleled its predecessor, with certain
notable exceptions.10 3  The new resolution required, instead of
allowing, the court to adopt a certification rule." 4 It permitted the
Court of Appeals to accept certified questions of law from "an
appellate court of another state," and dropped the reference to the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals and three-judge district
courts." Finally, it required the certifying court to determine that
there was no controlling precedent in the decisions of any of "the
courts of New York," not just the state's high court.10 6 A month later,
Appellate Justice in New York (Am. Judicature Soc'y 1982). Professor Rosenberg
suggested that New York's certification procedure allow the Court of Appeals to
accept certified questions from state courts as well as federal courts, and the Law
Revision Commission incorporated that proposal into A 8860. See Letter from
Michael J. Hutter, Executive Director, New York State Law Revision Commission, to
John Halloran (Jan. 4, 1984) (mistakenly designated 1983); accord Interview with
John J. Halloran, Jr. (May 12,2000).
97. Assemb. 2229, 208th Sess. (N.Y. 1983); Letter from John J. Halloran,
Legislative Assistant to Edward Griffith, to Joseph W. Bellacosa, Chief Clerk, New
York Court of Appeals (Apr. 29, 1982).
98. Assemb. 2229,208th Sess. (N.Y. 1983).
99. S. 5631, 208th Sess. (N.Y. 1983).
100. See N.Y. Legis. Rec. & Index, at A 172, S 465 (1983).
101. Interview with John J. Halloran, Jr. (May 12,2000).
102. Letter from Michael J. Hutter, Executive Director, New York State Law
Revision Commission, to Joseph W. Bellacosa, Chief Clerk, New York Court of
Appeals (Nov. 1, 1983); Memorandum of the Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 77,
at 2977; accord Letter from Michael J. Hutter to John Halloran, supra note 96;
Interview with John J. Halloran, Jr. (May 12,2000).
103. See S. 7316,209th Sess. (N.Y. 1984).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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Assemblyman Griffith introduced an identical resolution in the
Assembly.1 7
The Law Revision Commission made a persuasive case for the
resolutions, noting that the process by which federal courts were
ascertaining and applying New York law had "not produced wholly
satisfactory results," created "a federal invasion of the state law-
making process" and led "to federal-state friction," especially when
federal courts failed to predict the state position accurately." The
Commission also noted the "limited utility" of abstention1) 9
Although the Commission acknowledged the existence of objections
to certification, it dismissed them as avoidable or empirically
inaccurate.110 Underscoring the "general agreement" that certification
is the most effective method for resolving problems relating to the
prediction of state law, the Commission concluded that certification
"would facilitate federal-state and state-state judicial cooperation and
aid litigants." '  Thus, the Commission's support was unequivocal.12
The Assembly passed the resolution on April 30, 1984,113 followed
one month later by Senate passage of an amended version."1 The
amendment, made at the request of the Court of Appeals, changed
the phrase "state appellate court" to "appellate court of last resort of
107. Assemb. 8860,207th Sess. (N.Y. 1984).
108. Memorandum of the Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 77, at 2978-79.
109. Id. at 2980.
110. The objections mentioned by the Commission were that "the questions
presented are too abstract; the procedure seeks advisory opinions from state courts;
the procedure creates delay in the resolution of cases; and the procedure would create
unnecessary certifications that would overwhelm the state courts."Id. at 2982 (citing
Lillich & Mundy, supra note 35, at 900).
111. Memorandum of the Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 77, at 2982.
112. See id. at 2978-79. The Democratic Study Group of the New York State
Assembly also supported certification, noting that "[t]he certification procedure
proposed in this amendment has been regarded with extraordinary enthusiasm by
legal commentators and 25 jurisdictions have already adopted such procedures." It
also noted that the United States Supreme Court had expressed enthusiasm for the
procedure. Democratic Study Group of the N.Y. State Assemb., Rep. on B. No. A
5453, Constitutional Amendment Certification of Questions of Law to the New York
Court of Appeals. The New York State Bar Association took no position on the issue.
Id. As noted above, the New York County Lawyers' Association initially
disapproved the bill on the ground that further study was "required to establish that
the procedure, if implemented in New York State, would not cause unnecessary delay
and increased expense to litigants." N.Y.C.L.A. Report, supra note 93, at 1. In
August 1985, however, a County Lawyers' Association Committee recommended
approval of the constitutional amendment, with a few minor changes. This decision
was based on the "belief that the certification procedure, although necessarily
involving a delay in the federal court or sister state court proceeding, will result in a
more uniform interpretation and application of New York law and cause less of a
time delay and involve less expense than that currently faced by litigants encountering
the abstention doctrine." N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n Comm. on the Fed. Courts,
Comments on Proposed Constitutional Amendment Permitting Certification of
Questions of Law to the Court of Appeals of New York 6 (Aug. 1985).
113. N.Y. Legis. Rec. and Index, at A 609 (1984).
114. The Senate passed the resolution on May 29, 1984. Id.
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another state." '115 On May 31, the Assembly concurred in the
amendment and again passed the resolution.16 But more was needed:
amending the New York State Constitution requires passage by two
successive Legislatures and then an affirmative vote of the people."17
After a second passage by the Legislature, 118 New York voters
overwhelmingly endorsed the amendment, 119 and the certification
procedure became effective January 1, 1986120 as article VI, section
3(b), clause 9 of the New York State Constitution. That provision
reads:
The court of appeals shall adopt and from time to time may amend a
rule to permit the court to answer questions of New York law
certified to it by the Supreme Court of the United States, a court of
appeals of the United States or an appellate court of last resort of
115. Letter from Sol Wachtler, supra note 95. The letter indicated that "certain
members of our Court have expressed concern" that the language should be changed
to restrict state court certifications to those from state courts of last resort.
116. N.Y. Legis. Rec. and Index, at A 609 (1984).
117. N.Y. Const. art. XIX, § 1.
118. The resolutions passed in 1985-which had, as required, the identical language
to those passed in 1984-were N.Y. Senate Bill 3620 (1985) and N.Y. Assembly Bill
5453 (1985). The resolution passed the Senate on April 30, 1985, and the Senate
version substituted for the Assembly version on June 17. That same day, the
Assembly passed the resolution. N.Y. Legis. Rec. and Index, at S 306 (1985).
119. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 3(b), cl. 9. The amendment, which was on the ballot on
November 5, 1985, passed by a vote of 1,249,238 to 654,198. Manual for the use of the
Legislature of the State of New York (1988-89), at 216; Voters Approve CourtQuestion by Big Margin, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 7, 1985, at 1 (reporting that, with ninety-six
percent of the vote counted, 1,130,092 voted in favor of the amendment, and 601,055
voted against it).
Before a constitutional amendment is put to the voters in New York, the Attorney
General's office prepares a plain-language abstract of the amendment, which the
State Board of Elections may then alter. Telephone Interview by Frances Murray,
Librarian, Court of Appeals of the State of New York, with Lew A. Millenbach,
Office of the Attorney General of the State of New York (May 10, 2000); accord,
Telephone Interview by Frances Murray with Peter S. Kosinski, Deputy Executive
Director, New York State Board of Elections (May 15, 2000). The abstract
disseminated to the voters regarding the certification amendment read:
On occasion, an unresolved question of New York law may determine the
outcome of a case pending before a court of another state or a federal court.
This amendment would expand the jurisdiction of New York's highest court,
the Court of Appeals, by permitting it to answer such questions at the
request of the United States Supreme Court, a court of appeals of the
United States or the highest court of another state.
A yes vote on the question below would indicate your approval of the
amendment to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to permit it
to answer such questions. A no vote would indicate your disapproval.
New York voters were busy at the ballot on Election Day 1985, as the certification
procedure was one of five constitutional amendments confronting them that day. See
Carroll, supra note 92.
120. N.Y. Const. art. XIX, § 1 ("[If the people shall approve and ratify such
amendment or amendments by a majority of the electors voting thereon, such
amendment or amendments shall become a part of the constitution on the first day of
January next after such approval.").
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another state, which may be determinative of the cause then
pending in the certifying court and which in the opinion of the
certifying court are not controlled by precedent in the decisions of
the courts of New York.121
2. The Court of Appeals' Certification Rule
Elimination of the three obstacles identified by the Court of
Appeals cleared the way for court approval.'- The jurisdictional
infirmity was resolved by a constitutional amendment. Legislation
effective the same day as the certification procedure greatly reduced
the number of appeals as of right and gave the court broad certiorari
powers2m Moreover, the permissive language of the certification
amendment gave the court ultimate authority to decline questions."'
Finally, the requirement that questions be "determinative," along with
the Court's authority to establish its own rules for accepting certified
questions, resolved concerns regarding advisory opinions.'2
121. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 3(b), cl. 9.
122. See Memorandum dated April 23, 1984, attached to Letter from Sol Wachtler,
Judge, New York Court of Appeals, to Gordon Howe, II, Assistant Counsel to Senate
Majority Leader (Apr. 27, 1984) (expressing unanimous support of the bill).
123. Amendments enacted in 1985, and effective January 1. 1986-the same day as
the certification amendment-eliminated several categories of civil appeals as of
right. See Act of July 11, 1985, ch. 300, § 1, 1985 N.Y. Laws 2182; N.Y. C.P.LR. 5601
(McKinney 1995). At present, a party may appeal as of right in a civil case when two
judges at the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division (an intermediate
appellate court) dissent on a question of law, or a substantial constitutional question
is directly at issue in an appellate division order. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5601. Prior to the
1985 amendments, a party in a civil case could also appeal when a single justice below
dissented, when the appellate division reversed the judgment or order appealed from,
or when the appellate division substantially modified the judgment or order of the
court below. See Act of July 11, 1985, supra. On the criminal side, all non-capital
appeals to the court of appeals are by permission only. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§
450.90, 460.20 (McKinney 1994). A defendant who is sentenced to death, by contrast,
may appeal as of right directly to the court of appeals. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 3(b);
N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 450.70.
124. See Memorandum dated April 23, 1984, supra note 122 (noting that, if the
legislation restricting appeals as of right to the Court of Appeals was not enacted, the
court "would, of necessity, have to limit the amount of certified questions we would
accept").
125. See id. ("[W]e believe that an essential requirement of the proposed
legislation is to allow this Court to establish its own rules with respect to the selection
of those certified questions which this Court will address"). In the early days of inter-jurisdictional certification, the contention that certified questions seek advisory
opinions was "[p]robably the most damaging argument against the use of
certification." Corr & Robbins, supra note 28, at 419. This concern is minimized,
however, by the requirement that the certified questions of New York law "may be
determinative." N.Y. Ct. R. § 500.17(b) (N.Y. Ct. App.) (McKinney 2000).
Furthermore, as one early commentator noted:
In inter-jurisdictional certification ... the answer is responsive to a question
which was presented in actual litigation and presumably was posed
nonabstractly by a federal court bound to solicit an answer in accordance
with a standard at least as stringent as the state's own justiciability
2000]
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The certification amendment required that the court adopt a rule
permitting it to accept certified questions, and allows the court to
amend its rule "from time to time.' ' 2 6 Thus, rather than specify a
particular certification procedure in the constitutional amendment,
which then would be difficult to change, the legislature opted to leave
the details to the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its rule-making
power.2 7 On December 17, 1985, the court adopted the following
rule:
Whenever it appears to the Supreme Court of the United States, any
United States Court of Appeals, or a court of last resort of any other
state that determinative questions of New York law are involved in
a cause pending before it for which there is no controlling precedent
of the Court of Appeals, such court may certify the dispositive
questions of law to the Court of Appeals."
This rule parallels the constitutional provision in setting forth which
courts may certify questions to the Court of Appeals, with one
significant difference. Although the Constitution allows the court to
accept certified questions of law "not controlled by precedent in the
decisions of the courts of New York," the Rule allows certification of
questions "for which there is no controlling precedent of the Court of
Appeals." Thus, the court has allowed certification where it has not
spoken, though there may be relevant precedent in other New York
courts.
129
requirement. Most significantly, that answer will determine the rights of
federal court parties, will have res judicata and stare decisis effect, and will
authoritatively settle state law on the question.
Levin, supra note 29, at 357. Most state courts that have considered the issue have
concluded that answers to certified questions are not advisory opinions. See, e.g., W.
Helicopter Servs., Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 811 P.2d 627, 633 (Or. 1991)
(stating that while the court's authority does not extend to advisory opinions, it does
extend to certified questions); Schlieter v. Carlos, 775 P.2d 709, 710 (N.M. 1989)
(finding that the intent behind certification is to avoid issuing advisory opinions).
126. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 3(b), cl. 9.
127. See 1986 Annual Report of the Clerk of the Court to the Judges of the N.Y.
Court of Appeals 13 (noting that "the flexible rule adopted by the Court" would
allow the court to tailor procedures to "the peculiar circumstances of the
certification").
128. N.Y. Ct. R. § 500.17(a). The provision was effective January 1, 1986, the same
day as the certification amendment. The parallel rule of the Second Circuit, the most
frequent sender of certified questions to the state Court of Appeals, provides that the
Circuit Court may, on motion of a party or sua sponte, "certify to the highest court of
a state an unsettled and significant question of state law that will control the outcome
of a case pending before this Court." N.Y. Ct. R. § 0.27 (2d Cir.) (McKinney 2000).
The rule further provides that certification "will be in accordance with the procedures
provided by the state's legislature or highest state court rules," and that certification
"may stay the proceedings in this Court pending the state court's decision whether to
accept the certification and its decision of the certified question." Id.
129. The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, in contrast, restricts the
ability of a state high court to answer certified questions to those situations where
"there is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision, or statute of this
State." Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act § 3 (1995).
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A court wishing to certify a question to the Court of Appeals must
prepare a certificate that includes:
[T]he caption of the case, a statement of facts setting forth the
nature of the cause and the circumstances out of which the questions
of New York law arise, and the questions of New York law, not
controlled by precedent, which may be determinative, together with
a statement as to why the issue should be addressed in the Court of
Appeals.m
The document must be certified by the clerk of the court and along
with "all relevant portions of the record and other papers before the
certifying court, as it may direct," filed with the Clerk of the Court of
Appeals.131
When the Court of Appeals receives a request for certification, the
matter is referred to an individual judge of the court, who circulates a
written recommendation to the full court on whether to accept it.112
An accepted certification is treated as a regular appeal, -33 and upon
130. N.Y. Ct. R. § 500.17(b) (N.Y. Ct. App.) (McKinney 2000).
131. Id. at § 500.17(c). If any additional papers are required for proper review of
the question, the court, through the Clerk, may request them. Id. at § 500.17(e).
Furthermore, if the constitutionality of a New York statute affecting the public
interest is involved, and neither the state nor a state agency is a party, the Clerk of the
Court must notify the state Attorney General. Id. at § 500.17(0.
132. 1998 Annual Report of the Clerk of the Court to the Judges of the N.Y. State
Court of Appeals 7. One commentator has suggested that this rule is "contrary to the
will of the people of New York" reflected in the constitutional amendment allowing
the court to accept certified questions, as the constitutional provision does not state-
as does the Court of Appeals Rule-that the court should review the merits of the
question in deciding whether to accept it. Jack 1. Rose, Note, Erie R.R. and State
Power to Control State Law: Switcing Tracks to New Certification of Questions of
Law Procedures, 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 421, 432-33 (1989). This criticism ignores the
express grant of constitutional authority to the court to "adopt and from time to
time... amend a rule to permit the court to answer questions of New York law
certified to it." N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 3(b), cl. 9 (emphasis added). The constitution
leaves to the court the procedures for accepting certified questions, and by the use of
the word "permit," clearly contemplates the Court's rejection of questions that would
not further the salutary goals of certification or which would unduly burden the
Court's docket. Indeed, no state has adopted a procedure that requires its high court
to accept a certified question.
133. 1998 Annual Report of the Clerk of the Court to the Judges of the New York
State Court of Appeals 7. The court makes a threshold determination of the
procedure to follow for deciding the merits. N.Y. Ct. R. § 500.17(d) (N.Y. Ct. App.)
(McKinney 2000). In addition to deciding a case after full briefing and oral argument,
the Court of Appeals may examine the merits of an appeal, on its own motion, by an
expedited procedure. Such expedited appeals may be determined on the briefs
submitted to previous courts, the record and writings of the courts below and
additional written submissions of counsel. See id at § 500.4. An expedited procedure
is generally used in cases governed by clear recent controlling precedent or narrow
issues of law not of overriding or stateide importance, or where there are non-
reviewable questions of discretion, affirmed findings of fact or non-preserved issues of
law. Although these factors are not likely to be present when the court accepts a
certified question of law, the expedited procedure was used by the Court of Appeals
in resolving the first question certified to it, in Kidney v. Kolmar Laboratories, Inc-, 68
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resolution of the case, the clerk of the state court transmits the
decision to the certifying court.'3
B. Key Provisions of New York's Certification Procedure
Like every other certification jurisdiction, New York accepts
certified questions from the United States Supreme Court and federal
courts of appeals.135  Along with 18 other states, it also accepts
questions from other state high courts.'36 Unlike 36 jurisdictions,
however, New York does not accept certified questions from federal
District Courts.1 37 The intention here was both to prevent a flood of
certified questions and to provide the state Court of Appeals with the
benefit of a fully developed record and lower court opinions, as it
would ordinarily have in a case that originated in the state system. 138
An appropriate court may certify a question only when it appears
that "determinative questions of New York law are involved," 13 and
the certifying court must state the open questions of New York law
that "may be determinative" of the case.1 40 The use of "may" instead
of "must" eliminates the potential for "undue litigation regarding
whether a question is determinative of the entire litigation,"'' and
N.Y.2d 343 (1986). See N.Y. Ct. R. § 500.4(b).
134. See N.Y. Ct. R. § 500.17(g).
135. See Goldschmidt, supra note 73, at 15-16 (tbl. 2).
136. See id. at 16-17 (tbl. 2); see also Cal. R. Ct. 29.5(a) (West rev. ed. 2000) (stating
that the California Supreme Court may answer certified questions of law from the
court of last resort of any state).
137. See Goldschmidt, supra note 73, at 15-16 (tbl. 2). The Uniform Act uses the
all-encompassing phrase "court of the United States," which is meant to include all
federal courts, including bankruptcy courts. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law
Act § 3 (1995).
A few states also allow specialized federal courts to submit certified questions of
law, such as the Court of International Trade, the Bankruptcy Court, the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, the Tax Court, and the
Court of Military Appeals. See Goldschmidt, supra note 73, at 17 (tbl. 2).
138. See Memorandum of the Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 77, at 2985-86.
Despite the fears of the Commission and the other jurisdictions that have excluded
district court certification in order to prevent too many certified questions,
certification has been used judiciously, and "there has been no avalanche even in
those states which permit district court certification." Braun, supra note 28, at 957-58;
see also J. Michael Medina, The Interjurisdictional Certification of Questions of Law
Experience: Federal, State, and Oklahoma-Should Arkansas Follow?, 45 Ark. L.
Rev. 99, 114 (1992) ("Empirical evidence from states which permit district court
certification shows that state appellate dockets are not flooded by questions certified
from district courts.").
139. N.Y. Ct. R. § 500.17(a) (N.Y. Ct. App.) (McKinney 2000).
140. Id. at § 500.17(b). The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act has a
more permissive standard, allowing a state high court to answer a certified question of
law "if the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation." Unif.
Certification of Questions of Law Act § 3 (1995) (emphasis added).
141. Bassler & Potenza, supra note 19, at 551; see also Robbins, supra note 48, at
179-80 (arguing that the "must be determinative" language "leads to
counterproductive battles concerning which questions should be answered. The
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"allows both the certifying and answering courts to reach the crux of
the substantive issue quickly."'42
III. THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE
Since inter-jurisdictional certification became available in New
York, the Court of Appeals has received forty-five requests, most
posing multiple questions. 143 Forty-four have been sent by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, one by the Eleventh
Circuit.
Of these requests-most of which have come in recent years-the
court has accepted thirty-nine, declined five and one remains pending.
In two cases, accepted questions were withdrawn by the Second
Circuit before the state court answered, and five other cases are
currently scheduled for briefing and argument. The average time
from certification to acceptance or rejection has been approximately
six weeks, and the average time from acceptance to resolution about
six months.'" Thus, one of the primary objections to the concept of
certification-undue delay-has not been a problem in New York. *
answering and certifying courts then become bogged down in procedural, rather than
substantive, determinations.").
142. Robbins, supra note 48, at 180. The dispositive significance of the issue in the
pending federal case is clearly important to the state court. Indeed, the "may be
determinative" requirement has contributed to the rejection of certified questions in
two cases, Retail Software Servs., Inc. v. Lashlee, 71 N.Y.2d 788 (1988), and Yesil v.
Reno, 92 N.Y.2d 455 (1998). See infra notes 213-23, 243.48 and accompanying text.
The state court, nevertheless, has been cognizant of the distinction between -may be
determinative" and the stricter "must be determinative." For example, in Hertz Corp.
v. City of New York, 967 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1992), the question certified was whether a
local law enacted by the New York City Council was preempted by provisions of New
York's General Business Law enacted by the state legislature. The state court
accepted the question, even though it was not necessarily determinative of the appeal.
If the court answered in the negative, which it did, the Second Circuit still could have
struck down the local law on federal preemption grounds, as plaintiff claimed the law
also violated the federal Constitution and Sherman Antitrust Act. See id. at 56. On
the other hand, if the certified question were answered in the affirmative, the local
law would be invalid and the Second Circuit would not have to reach the federal
preemption questions. Id. at 57. Thus, while the question would not have satisfied a
"must be determinative" standard, it did satisfy the "may be determinative" standard.
143. Statistics in this article concerning certification to the New York Court of
Appeals are accurate as of Oct. 13, 2000. Citations to the questions received by the
New York State Court of Appeals and its responses are provided in Appendix B
infra. Between 1990 and 1994, the average number of questions certified by United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals nationvide was 14.8. During that period, the Second
Circuit certified thirteen questions to the state Court of Appeals. See Goldschmidt,
supra note 73, at 28.
144. See Memorandum from Laurene L. Tacy, Assistant Deputy Clerk of the Court
of Appeals, to Stuart M. Cohen, Clerk of the Court of Appeals (June 30, 2000).
Through the first half of 2000, when the court accepted two of the three questions
received, the average time from certification to acceptance or rejection was
approximately five weeks. Id.
145. But see, eg., Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Sill' Question..., 29
Suffolk U. L. Rev. 677, 681 n.18, 688-89 (1995) (discussing cases in which state courts
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A. Certification in Practice
1. The Certification Era Begins
Six months after certification became effective in New York, the
Second Circuit sent its inaugural request: "whether money advanced
by an insurer on behalf of its insured to an injured party, prior to
settlement or judgment of a tort action, is 'the payment of any monies'
within the meaning of section 104-b(2) of the New York Social
Services Law."' 46 The federal court decided that the question should
be resolved by the state court because there was no controlling
precedent and the issue seemed "likely to recur with some
frequency.'147
The question arose in a case in which William Kidney, Jr., an infant,
was injured on defendant Kolmar's property. 4 8 Kolmar's insurer
voluntarily advanced $30,000 to William's father for medical
treatment, and the Department of Social Services (the "DSS")
advanced $27,503. William and his father later sued Kolmar in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
resulting in judgment against Kolmar for $22,500. Two weeks after
the entry of judgment, DSS filed a lien, pursuant to New York Social
Services Law section 104-b, for the money previously paid to
William's father. Effectiveness of the lien depended on whether
Kolmar had been notified of it "prior to the payment of any moneys
to [the] injured party.1' 49 The certified question arose because the
statutory phrase "payment of any moneys" could be interpreted two
ways: "broadly to include any delivery of money, or narrowly to
include only required transfers."'150
Kidney v. Kolmar presented an ideal scenario for certification: an
open choice between two reasonable readings of a New York statute
would resolve a federal case. After the state court answered the
question in the negative, 5 1 the Second Circuit, in disposing of the
case, praised certification as a "valuable device for securing prompt
and authoritative resolution of unsettled questions of state law,
especially those that seem likely to recur and to have significance
beyond the interests of the parties in a particular lawsuit.' 152
took a long time to respond to certified questions, and noting that, while certification
may be faster than abstention, it still is not as fast as federal court determination of all
issues before it).
146. Kidney v. Kolmar Labs., No. 86-7194, slip op. at 2-3 (2d Cir. July 7, 1986).
147. Id. at 3.
148. See Kidney v. Kolmar Labs., 68 N.Y.2d 343,344 (1986).
149. N.Y. Soc. Services Law § 104-b[2] (McKinney 1993).
150. Kidney, 68 N.Y.2d at 345.
151. See id. at 346-47.
152. Kidney v. Kolmar Labs., 808 F.2d 955, 957 (2d Cir. 1987).
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2. The Court of Appeals' Experience Answering Certified
Questions
Since Kidney, certified questions have settled New York law in
areas as diverse as the rule against perpetuities, t  the attorney-client
privilege,'5 loss of consortium 55 and malicious prosecution.'! One
particularly fruitful area has been products liability, a field well suited
for certification, as it is dominated by state common law and arises
frequently in federal diversity cases. Thus, it is hardly surprising that
several of New York's certified questions have involved product-
related injuries. For example, in Bocre Leasing Corp. v. General
Motors Corp.,' 7 the issue was whether New York law allowed the
purchaser of a helicopter to recover under either strict liability or
negligence theories for damages to the craft caused by a defective
engine.'58 The court answered this open policy question in the
negative, holding that tort recovery "should not be available to a
downstream purchaser where the claimed losses flow from damage to
the property that is the subject of the contract. 159 In doing so, the
court adopted the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in
East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.,"W thereby
placing New York "in the mainstream, where it belongs in such
matters. 161
In Denny v. Ford Motor Co.," the core question was whether, in
New York, causes of action for strict products liability and breach of
implied warranty were necessarily coextensive, again a policy choice
between reasonable alternatives." - The underlying personal injury
153. See Wildenstein & Co. v. Wallis, 79 N.Y.2d 641 (1992).
154. See Madden v. Creative Servs., Inc., 84 N.Y.2d 738 (1995).
155. See Consorti v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 86 N.Y.2d 449 (1995).
156. See Engel v. CBS, Inc., 93 N.Y.2d 195 (1999).
157. 20 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 1994).
158. See Bocre Leasing Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 84 N.Y.2d 685 (1995).
159. Id. at 694.
160. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
161. Bocre Leasing, 84 N.Y.2d at 693-94.
162. 42 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1994), certified question answered in 87 N.Y.2d 248 (1995).
163. In addition to Bocre and Denny, the Second Circuit has, on several occasions,
certified questions containing policy choices "singularly appropriate for resolution by
the New York Court of Appeals." Banque Worms v. BankAmerica Int'l, No. 90-
710617107, slip op. at 5 (2d Cir. May 30, 1990); see, e.g., Royal Indem. Co. v.
Providence Wash. Ins. Co., No. 97-7301 (2d Cir. Mar. 6, 1998) (validity of exclusion in
truckers' insurance policy); West-Fair Elec. Contractors v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 49
F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 1995) (enforcement of liens); Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v.
N.Y. State Div. of Hous. & Cmty. Renewal, No. 94-7677 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 1995) (rent
stabilization); Madden v. Creative Servs., Inc., 24 F.3d 394 (2d Cir. 1994) (third party
intrusion into attorney-client privilege); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. New York City
Transit Auth., 990 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1993) (validity of contractual alternative dispute
resolution provision authorizing the employee of a party to make binding decisions on
all questions arising under the contract); Hertz Corp. v. City of New York, 967 F.2d
54 (2d Cir. 1992) (preemption of municipal legislation by state legislation); Home Ins.
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action arose after plaintiffs sport-utility vehicle rolled over. The
district judge submitted plaintiff's claims for strict products liability
and breach of implied warranty of merchantability to the jury, over
Ford's protests that they were identical. Responding to
interrogatories, the jury found that Ford was not strictly liable because
the vehicle was not "defective," but also found that Ford had
breached its implied warranty of merchantability. 164 On appeal, Ford
argued that the breach of implied warranty cause of action had "been
subsumed by the more recently adopted, and more highly evolved,
strict products liability theory."165
The state court, in responding to the Second Circuit's certified
questions, concluded Ford overlooked "the continued existence of a
separate statutory predicate for the breach of warranty theory and the
subtle but important distinction between the two theories. '"" Thus,
the court determined that, under New York law, a rational factfinder
could have found for defendant on the strict liability claim and for
plaintiff on the warranty claim. 167
Products liability was also central to Liriano v. Hobart Corp., in
which plaintiff, a supermarket employee, was injured on the job while
feeding meat into a commercial grinder manufactured by Hobart. At
the time the grinder was sold, an affixed safety guard prevented the
user's hands from coming into contact with the machine's dangerous
parts. Before the accident, however, the safety guard had been
removed, a common practice of which the manufacturer was aware.
After plaintiff sued Hobart in state court on negligence and strict
products liability theories, Hobart removed the case to federal court
and impleaded plaintiff's employer. The federal court dismissed all of
plaintiff's claims except those based on failure to warn, and a jury
concluded that Hobart's failure to warn was a proximate cause of
plaintiff's injuries.169
Co. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 873 F.2d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 1989) (duty of insurer to
"reimburse insured for punitive damages awarded [in an] out-of-state judgment");
and Banque Worms, No. 90-7106/7107, slip op. at 5 (ability to recover money sent in a
mistaken wire transfer).
164. Denny, 87 N.Y.2d at 253-54.
165. Id. at 255.
166. Id.
167. For commentary on Denny, see Peter J. Ausili, Ramifications of Denny v.
Ford Motor Co., 15 Touro L. Rev. 735 (1999); Sean M. Flower, Is Strict Product
Liability in Tort Identical to Implied Warranty in Contract in the Context of Personal
Injuries?: Denny v. Ford Motor Company, 62 Mo. L. Rev. 381 (1997); Victor E.
Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, An Unhappy Return to Confusion in the Common Law
of Products Liability-Denny v. Ford Motor Company Should Be Overturned, 17
Pace L. Rev. 359 (1997).
168. 132 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 1998).
169. The jury concluded that, between defendants, Hobart was 5% liable, and
plaintiff's employer, who owned the grinder when the guard was removed, was 95%
liable. The jury subsequently assigned one-third of the responsibility to plaintiff. Id.
at 125-26.
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On appeal, defendants argued that as a matter of law,
manufacturers had no duty to warn in these circumstances. Although
they must warn users of the foreseeable dangers inherent in their
products,170 manufacturers in New York cannot be held liable for strict
liability or negligence where, "after the product leaves [their]
possession and control. .. , there is a subsequent modification [that]
substantially alters the product" and causes plaintiff's injuries."' On
the other hand, manufacturers are under a continuing duty to warn of
dangers that are discovered after the sale of the product.'1 The
tension between these principles had led to a split in authority over
whether a failure to warn claim such as plaintiff's was cognizable,1'3
and prompted the Second Circuit to ask the Court of Appeals whether
manufacturer liability can "exist under a failure to warn theory in
cases in which the substantial modification defense would preclude
liability under a design defect theory."'74 The state court answered
the question in the affirmative, finding persuasive a manufacturer's
duty "to warn against the dangers of foreseeable misuse of its
product,""1 5 as well as dangers that present themselves after a product
has been sold. 76
Contract law has been another fertile area for certification in New
York. In Rooney v. Tyson,"7 for example, a former trainer of boxer
Mike Tyson sued for breach of his employment contract. A federal
jury found for the trainer, but the verdict was sustainable only if the
employment was not "at will." The Second Circuit, finding the
common law interpretive principles unclear, certified the question
whether the oral contract for Rooney to train Tyson '"for as long as
the boxer fights professionally"' was for a fixed duration, in which
170. See, eg., Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 79 N.Y.2d 289, 297 (1992)
("[A] plaintiff may recover in strict products liability or negligence when a
manufacturer fails to provide adequate warnings regarding the use of its
product .... ).
171. Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 475
(1980).
172- See Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261,274-75 (1984).
173. See Liriano, 132 F.3d at 129-31 (citing cases).
174. Id at 132.
175. Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 232,240 (1998) (citing Lugo v. UN Toys,
Ltd., 75 N.Y.2d 850 (1990)).
176. See id; see also Cover, 61 N.Y.2d at 274-75 (noting that a manufacturer may be
liable for failing to warn of risks that the manufacturer learns of after the sale). The
Court of Appeals declined to answer the second part of the Second Circuit's
question-whether a manufacturer's liability on a failure to warn theory would be
barred as a matter of law on the facts of this case-as a resolution of this issue
required a fact-specific inquiry but did not involve any unsettled New York law.
Liriano, 92 N.Y.2d at 243. For a detailed analysis of Liriano, see Hildy Bowbeer &
David S. Killoran, Liriano v. Hobart Corp.: Obvious Dangers, the Duty to Warn of
Safer Alternatives, and the Heeding Presumption, 65 Brook. L. Rev. 717 (1999).
177. 127 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 1997), certified question answered in 91 N.Y.2d 685
(1998).
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case the employment would not be at will. 7 ' After clarifying state law
regarding what constitutes a "definite" duration, the New York State
Court of Appeals held that the contract between Rooney and Tyson
fell into that category, rendering the at-will doctrine inapplicable.
The question in Norcon Power Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk
Power Corp.17 9 required the state Court of Appeals to determine
whether a party may demand adequate assurances of future
performance when there are reasonable grounds to believe that a
solvent counterpart will commit a breach in a transaction that was not
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code.1 0 Noting the
effectiveness of the Code provision for the demand for future
performance and the incentive that such a procedure provides for
parties to resolve their disputes without judicial intervention, the
court chose to apply the same standard as a matter of common law,
thus answering the open state law issue in the affirmative. 181
A variety of other unsettled contract issues have also been resolved
by answers to certified questions. Topics have included the part
performance exception to the Statute of Frauds, 182 the validity of an
alternative dispute resolution provision, ' 3 a pay-when-paid clause in a
subcontract, 184 and a number of insurance disputes.1 5
178. Rooney, 127 F.3d at 296-98. For a discussion of at-will employment, see
Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 69 N.Y.2d 329, 333-36 (1987).
179. 92 N.Y.2d 458 (1998).
180. Id. at 460. The New York U.C.C. provides "[wihen reasonable grounds for
insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party the other may in
writing demand adequate assurance of due performance and until he receives such
assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend any performance for which he has
not already received the agreed return." N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-609(1) (McKinney 1993).
181. Norcon Power, 92 N.Y.2d at 468. The court limited its holding to long-term
commercial contracts that are "complex and not reasonably susceptible of all security
features being anticipated, bargained for and incorporated." Id.
182. Messner Vetere Berger McNamee Schmetterer Euro RSCG Inc. v. Aegis
Group PLC, 93 N.Y.2d 229 (1999).
183. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. New York City Transit Auth., 82 N.Y.2d 47
(1993).
184. West-Fair Elec. Contractors v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 87 N.Y.2d 148 (1995).
185. Insurance contracts, a staple of the state court docket, have been a steady
source of certified questions. The court has been asked to determine whether "'a
commercial general liability policy [was] excess to the third-party liability coverage
provided by a homeowner's policy,"' where both policies covered the subject loss, see
Great N. Ins. Co. v. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 92 N.Y.2d 682, 684 (1999);
"'[wihether a non-trucking-use exclusion from coverage in an insurance policy
obtained by the owner of a commercial vehicle is valid"' in New York, see Royal
Indem. Co. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 92 N.Y.2d 653, 656 (1998); whether conduct
fell within a clause excluding coverage for assault and battery, see Mount Vernon Fire
Ins. Co. v. Creative Hous. Ltd., 88 N.Y.2d 347 (1996); whether a reinsurer must
"prove prejudice before it can successfully invoke"' a late-notice defense, see
Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. N. River Ins. Co., 79 N.Y.2d 576, 581 (1992); and whether an
insurer is required to reimburse the insured for punitive damages awarded in an out-
of-state judgment, see Home Ins. Co. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 75 N.Y.2d 196
(1990).
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Because statutory interpretation is so much a part of today's
litigation landscape,"s it is not surprising that several certified
questions have dealt with construction of state statutes invoked in
federal court. Questions sent to the state court have involved statutes
relating to personal jurisdiction,' 7 rent stabilization,188 limitations
periods," 9 elevation-related hazards to workers", and truck owner
liability for injuries sustained during unloading."'
Recently, certification enabled the state Court of Appeals to define
the scope of New York's right to privacy statutes, which had been
invoked in a federal diversity action. In Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr
Printing & Publishing,"2 plaintiff, a teenage model who had posed for
a series of photographs to appear in Young & Modern magazine, sued
the publisher in federal court after the pictures were published in
conjunction with a "Love Crisis" advice column headlined "I got
trashed and had sex with three guys." '93 Plaintiff alleged that the
magazine violated sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights
Law by using her photographs for trade purposes without consent,"9
and a jury found in her favor.
The appeal centered on interpretation of New York Civil Rights
Law sections 50 and 51. The state Court of Appeals had earlier
established that these statutes did not apply to reports of newsworthy
events or matters of public interest. 9 The court also made clear that
this "newsworthiness exception" was inapplicable both where pictures
had no real relationship to the article and where the article was a
disguised advertisement.' 96 In the Second Circuit's view, however,
there existed a conflict of New York authority on whether there was
186. Despite the enduring importance of the common law, the proliferation of
legislation during the last half of the twentieth century has made statutory
interpretation "likely the principal task engaged in by state courts." Judith S. Kaye,
State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes
and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 18-19 (1995); see also Guido Calabresi, A
Common Law for the Age of Statutes 1 (Harv. Univ. Press 1982) (discussing the
"'statutorification' of American law").
187. Landoil Res. Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Sers., Inc., 77 N.Y.2d 28
(1990).
188. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. & Cmty.
Renewal, 87 N.Y.2d 325 (1995).
189. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. ABB Power Generation, Inc., 91 N.Y.2d 180 (1997).
190. Joblon v. Solow, 91 N.Y.2d 457 (1998).
191. Argentina v. Emery World Wide Delivery Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 554 (1999).
192. 94 N.Y.2d 436 (2000).
193. Id. at 439.
194. Section 51 of the Civil Rights Law provides, in relevant part, that "[alny
person whose name, portrait, picture or voice is used within this state for.., the
purposes of trade without the written consent first obtained as above provided [in
section 50] may... sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of
such use." N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 51 (McKinney 1992 and Supp. 2000).
195. Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 123 (1993); Stephano v. News Group
Publ'ns, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 184 (1984).
196. Finger v. Omni Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 77 N.Y.2d 138, 143 (1990).
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an additional, third limitation, where use of a photograph was
substantially fictionalized."9 Thus, the federal court asked the state
court whether a plaintiff may recover under sections 50 and 51 "where
the defendant used the plaintiff's likeness in a substantially
fictionalized way without the plaintiff's consent, even if the
defendant's use of the image was in conjunction with a newsworthy
column?"'198
Answering in the negative, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
only relevant questions were whether a real relationship existed
between the photograph and the article, and whether the article was
an advertisement in disguise. As for the "substantial fictionalization"
cases, the state court held that they apply only when an article is "so
infected with fiction, dramatization or embellishment that it cannot be
said to fulfill the purpose of the newsworthiness exception."
1 99
Because the "Love Crisis" column did not fall into that category-it
was concededly newsworthy-plaintiff could not successfully invoke
the Civil Rights Law.2'
B. Cases in Which Certification Was Not Used
Because certification is discretionary for both federal and state
courts, there will invariably be instances when a court declines to
answer questions sent by another jurisdiction. Likewise, courts
sometimes choose not to certify open questions. Thus, cases in which
the procedure has been successfully invoked tell only part of the story.
To complete the picture, it is also necessary to consider cases in which
either jurisdiction has decided against certification.
1. Questions Asked But Not Answered
Despite the auspicious beginning in Kidney v. Kolmar, certification
was little used in New York during its early years.20 ' Federal court
197. See, e.g., Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124 (1967) (allowing
recovery under section 51 of New York's Civil Rights Law when the presentation is
knowingly fictionalized); Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of Am., 210 N.Y. 51, 57 (1913) ("A
picture within the meaning of the statute is not necessarily a photograph... , but
includes any representation.... ").
198. Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing & Publ'g, 175 F.3d 262, 266 (2d Cir.
1999). The federal court also asked whether there are any additional limitations on
plaintiff's cause of action that precluded her recovery in the case. Id. In light of the
state court's response to the first certified question, it was unnecessary to answer the
second. See infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
199. Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing & Publ'g, 94 N.Y.2d 436, 446 (2000).
200. The Second Circuit ultimately vacated the District Court's judgment and
remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the state court's answer. See
Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing & PubI'g, 208 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2000),
petition for cert. filed (May 30, 2000) (No. 99-1915).
201. In the first five years of the procedure's availability, the state Court of
Appeals received certified questions only seven times. See infra Appendix B.
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reluctance to certify may have stemmed from fears that certified
questions would burden already busy state courts, thus extending
delays for federal court litigants,'2 or would require state courts to
answer abstract questions without adequate grounding in the relevant
facts. 3 Courts also needed time to learn when the procedure could
be used to best advantage, and when complications impeded its most
effective use. In this regard, on five occasions the New York State
Court of Appeals has declined to answer questions certified by the
Second Circuit. Because both the federal court in certifying, and the
state court in declining, have followed the mutually beneficial practice
of stating the grounds for their decisions-a practice not uniformly
followed elsewhere -a review of these cases is particularly
instructive about optimal use of the procedure.'z°
Two of the first four times the Second Circuit certified questions,
the state court rejected them, no doubt contributing to federal courts'
wariness of the procedure. Rufino v. United Statesi -which followed
on the heels of Kidney-presented two questions regarding whether
"loss of enjoyment of life" is a distinct element of damages for a
plaintiff rendered comatose by a defendant's negligence.' °  The
questions presented open, dispositive state law issues, meeting the
202. See The Comm. on Fed. Courts of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New
York, Analysis of State Laws Providing for Certification by Federal Courts of
Determinative State Issues of Law, 42 Rec. Ass'n B. City N.Y. 101, 111, 125 (1987)
(noting that "concern about delay has been one of the reasons cited by various courts
which have declined to certify questions," concluding that certification -would in
most cases merely add to the time and expense of resolving disputes and frustrate
litigants who are properly before the federal courts," and recommending that the
Second Circuit certify only in a "rare case"); see also Larry M. Roth, Certified
Question from the Federal Courts: Review and Re-proposal, 34 U. Miami L Rev. 1
(1979) (arguing that Florida should establish a specialized court to deal with certified
questions).
203. See Schneider, supra note 48, at 294.
204. Not all courts state their reasons for declining certified questions. See, e.g.,
Conn. Performing Arts Found., Inc. v. Brown, 801 F.2d 566,568 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting
that the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected a certified question in that case without
comment); Schneider, supra note 48, at 315 ("The Michigan Supreme Court, to say
the least, is not very receptive to the certified question. Not only does the court
refuse to answer most questions, but it generally fails to state the reasons for its
refusal."); Selya, supra note 145, at 681-82 n.19 (citing cases in which state courts gave
little or no reason for rejecting certified questions).
205. Of course, rejection of a certified question is not a decision on the merits, and
therefore offers no clue as to how the state court would answer the question. See
Richard Alan Chase, Note, A State Court's Refitsal to Answer Certified Questions: Are
Inferences Permitted?, 66 St. John's L. Rev. 407, 422 (1992).
206. 69 N.Y.2d 310 (1987).
207. The questions were:
(a) whether "loss of normal pursuits and pleasures of life" or -loss of
enjoyment of life" is a separately compensable item of damages apart from
other items, such as pain and suffering; and (b) if so, whether a claimant
must possess cognitive awareness in order to recover for such a loss.
Id at 311 n.[*].
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threshold requirements for certification.2°  As the Second Circuit
noted, however, a state trial court had recently answered the identical
questions in a different case, McDougald v. Garber.209 Although the
trial court opinion in McDougald did not authoritatively represent the
law of the State of New York, the state court nonetheless declined
certification on the ground that McDougald was then pending in the
intermediate appellate court, and it was "unquestionably preferable in
the resolution of significant State law issues to secure the benefit
afforded by our normal process-the considered deliberation and
writing of our intermediate appellate court in a pending litigation. " 21°
A year later, the state court again declined a Second Circuit
request. At issue in Retail Software Services, Inc. v. Lashlee2 was
whether New York's Franchise Sales Act,212 which provides for service
of process on the secretary of state for any person who has sold a
franchise in the state, also provides a basis for personal jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants.213 The question arose in connection
with the purchase by Retail Software Services, a New York
corporation, of seven franchises for retail computer software stores
from Software Centre International ("SCI"), a California-based
franchisor. Shortly after the purchase, SCI went bankrupt and did not
perform the agreement. Retail Software commenced an action in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York,
claiming that SCI officers had violated the Franchise Sales Act by
making numerous misrepresentations during a California meeting
about SCI's financial condition and the agreements, and seeking
208. See McDougald v. Garber, 135 A.D.2d 80,82 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
209. McDougald v. Garber, 132 Misc. 2d 457 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
210. Rufino, 69 N.Y.2d at 312. The Court of Appeals eventually did confront the
questions presented in Rufino through the "normal process" of the McDougald
appeal. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court in McDougald, holding that
"loss of enjoyment is a damage element separate and distinct from pain and suffering,
for which compensation may be awarded despite the injured party's lack of cognitive
awareness." McDougald, 135 A.D.2d at 82. After the state Court of Appeals declined
to answer the certified questions in Rufino, the Second Circuit followed "the well
reasoned opinion" of the lower courts in McDougald. Rufino v. United States, 829
F.2d 354, 361 (2d Cir. 1987). When the state Court of Appeals decided McDougald,
however, it disagreed on both questions, holding that cognitive awareness is a
prerequisite to recovery, and that a jury should not make a "loss of enjoyment of life"
award separate from its pain and suffering award. McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d
246, 254 (1989).
211. 838 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1988).
212. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 686 (McKinney 1984). The statute provides:
Any person who shall offer to sell or sell a franchise in this state. as a
franchisor, subfranchisor or franchise sales agent shall be deemed to have
irrevocably appointed the secretary of state as his or its agent upon whom
may be served any summons, complaint... or other process directed to such
person ... in any action, investigation, or proceeding which arises under this
article or a rule hereunder, with the same force and validity as if served
personally on such person.
213. See Retail Software Servs., Inc. v. Lashlee, 71 N.Y.2d 788,789 (1988).
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recovery of deposits paid and expenses incurred under the
agreements.
The District Court granted the motion of three individual
defendants to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that the
Franchise Sales Act does not supply an independent basis for personal
jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction could not be obtained under New
York's long-arm statute.214 On appeal, defendants argued that use of
the Act to establish jurisdiction was not intended, and would violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.215 The Circuit
Court concluded that there was an open statutory interpretation issue
that should be decided by the state court, reasoning that the statute:
reflects a policy of the state legislature to protect operators of
franchises in New York State, because determination of the
legislative intent with respect to the possible jurisdictional
application of [the statute] is important to operators of many of the
franchises existing in New York, and because without a definitive
interpretation of the New York statute by the Court of Appeals
there would be no "sufficient sources of state law" to allow this
federal court to make a "principled rather than conjectural"
decision.... In addition, in view of the constitutional challenge to
plaintiff's interpretation of [the statute], it is appropriate that the
New York court should have an opportunity first to interpret the
statute.216
After initially accepting the question,217 the Court of Appeals
declined to answer on the ground that the question did not meet the
constitutional requirement that it "may be determinative of the
cause... pending in the certifying court. ' 21 8 If the court were to
answer the question in the affirmative, it would establish only that in
some circumstances the statute provides a basis for personal
jurisdiction, not necessarily "whether the statute provides a basis for
jurisdiction where, as in the present case, the individual defendants
have apparently engaged in no activities within this State. 2 1 9 Nor
would the answer be determinative if the court concluded that the
statute did not provide a basis for jurisdiction, as the question would
remain whether New York's long-arm statute would nevertheless
subject the defendants to suit in New York. Indeed, after the state
court declined to answer the question, the Second Circuit itself
concluded that personal jurisdiction could be exercised over
defendants pursuant to the long-arm statute, and found it unnecessary
to reach the question it had certified.'
214. See id. at 790; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a) (McKinney 1990).
215. See Retail Software Servs., 838 F.2d at 662.
216. Id. (citations omitted).
217. Retail Software Servs., 71 N.Y.2d at 789.
21& Id. (quoting N.Y. Coast. art. VI, § 3(b)(9)).
219. Id. at 790-91.
220. See Retail Softvare Servs., Inc. v. Lashlee, 854 F.2d 18,21 (2d Cir. 1988).
2000]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
A significant additional factor figured in the state court's
declination. With defendants' federal constitutional challenge
hovering in the background, the state court determined that it could
not answer the question posed "in a vacuum, divorced from
consideration of the constitutionality of the statute in its actual
application.""1  Because the certified question did not permit
consideration of the constitutional issue, the court "would have to
assume constitutionality in order to answer the question posed." '222
Thus, even if the question had been determinative-which it was
not-there existed an independent ground for declining to answer
it.223
After the Court of Appeals rejected the questions in Rufino and
Retail Software, there was concern that the "much heralded
certification procedure... [had] hit a snag."'2 4 Indeed, New York's
early experience highlighted difficulties associated with declining
certified questions: delaying the litigation, placing both courts in an
awkward position2 and leaving the federal court to answer questions
it said should be answered by the state court.2 26 These early rejections
obviously did little to enhance federal courts' zeal for the procedure.2 7
After Retail Software in 1988, the Second Circuit made only one
request in 1989,1 two in 1990,29 and three each in 1991230 and 1992.23
221. Retail Software Servs., 71 N.Y.2d at 791.
222. Id. Without the constitutional issue before it, the court cannot effectively
implement the rule of construction that courts "should, of course, interpret a statute
so as to avoid constitutional infirmities, if at all possible." People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d
674, 678 (1981).
223. After determining that New York's long-arm statute applied, the circuit court
applied the Supreme Court's "minimum contacts" jurisprudence, concluding that the
exercise of jurisdiction in this case would not violate the Due Process Clause. Retail
Software Servs., 854 F.2d at 22-24.
224. David D. Siegel, The Second Circuit Gets Some Mixed Signals From the New
York Court of Appeals About Certifying New York Law Questions, 346 N.Y. St. L.
Dig. 1 (Oct. 1988).
225. See Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 67, 99 (2d Cir. 2000) (characterizing as "obviously
unpleasant" the Court of Appeals' "task of refusing to accept questions certified by
this Court") (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
226. See, e.g., Conn. Performing Arts Found., Inc. v. Brown, 801 F.2d 566, 568 (2d
Cir. 1986) ("Although resolution of these questions of Connecticut law by the
Connecticut Supreme Court would appear to have been in the interest of judicial
economy, the supreme court denied certification without comment. Left without
guidance from the state on this question of state law portending serious consequences
for a significant cultural institution in the State of Connecticut, we must now, for
better or for worse, address [the questions].").
227. Despite the large number of cases the state Court of Appeals has accepted,
the rare declination still presents the possibility of chilling the certification
atmosphere. See Rangolan v. County of Nassau, Nos. 99-9343, 99-9397, 2000 WL
777952, at *6 (2d Cir. June 15, 2000) ("I know that in the current climate, i.e., in light
of [the declination of a certification request in] Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 67 (2d Cir.
2000), [certification] may not be a workable recommendation.").
228. See Home Ins. Co. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 873 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1989).
229. See Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc. v. Lloyd's Sydicate 317, 902 F.2d 165
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Early fears, however, have proved groundless, as subsequent
declinations have been few and far between. The next did not come
until eight years after Retail Sof-tvare, in Grabois v. Jones.' At issue
in Grabois, an interpleader action, was whether Junior Jones' second
wife was entitled to a portion of his death benefits even though the
marriage was void."3 Although the second marriage was performed
by a judge, yielded a marriage certificate and lasted almost thirty
years, the existence of a prior, undissolved marriage rendered it a
nullity. The administrator of Jones' union death benefit fund filed an
interpleader complaint pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")" in federal district court seeking a
declaration as to which of Jones' two wives was entitled to receive the
benefits.
The District Court ruled that because the second marriage was void,
Jones' second wife was not entitled to any of the benefits.235 On
appeal, the Circuit Court noted that several New York decisions
displayed a reluctance to find a second marriage void where an
apparent injustice would result, although the state's high court had not
addressed the issue. The court also noted that the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act entitled a person with a good faith belief that a
marriage is valid to an apportionment of property where required by
the interests of justice. Thus, the federal court sought guidance from
the state court as to whether it would extend this reasoning to the
context presented in Grabois.
The Circuit Court noted that although the question was not one
"likely to arise with much frequency," the stakes were high for the
parties, and fund administrators would benefit greatly from a "clearly
settled rule." The court also commented on the relationship
between state and federal law regarding such cases:
Because benefit disputes are now generally controlled by ERISA,
and hence almost always are tried in the federal courts, see 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(e)(1) (providing for nearly exclusive federal jurisdiction over
ERISA disputes), the New York Court of Appeals is unlikely to be
able to consider the question presented by this case on review of a
New York court decision. Thus, not only will this question not be
(2d Cir. 1990); Banque Worms v. BankAmerica Int'l, No. 90-71067107 (2d Cir. May
30,1990).
230. See Ass'n of Surrogates and Supreme Court Reporters v. New York, No. 90-
9036 (2d Cir. Mar. 21, 1991); Wildenstein & Co., Inc. v. Wallis, 949 F.2d 632 (2d Cir.
1991); Unigard Security Ins. Co., Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 949 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1991).
231. See Hertz Corp. v. City of New York, 967 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1992); Gonzales v.
Armac Indus., Ltd., 970 F.2d 1123 (2d Cir. 1992); Riordan v. Nationwide Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1992).
232. 77 F.3d 574 (2d Cir. 1996), certified question declined in 88 N.Y.2d 254 (1996).
233. See id. at 575-76.
234. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B), (e)(1) & (f).
235. See Grabois, 77 F.3d at 576.
236. Id. at 577-78.
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presented to the Court of Appeals except through certification, but
since federal courts will most often be the courts called upon in such
cases, these courts will continue to apply an uncertain New York
law, unless the question is settled through certification. 7
The state court saw the matter in a different light, and declined to
answer the question. With "the interplay between Federal and State
law in interpreting issues of statutory construction under ERISA...
as yet not fully settled," the court found the question to be "more
appropriate for resolution in the first instance by the Federal
courts.""8 The state court also noted the federal court's prediction
that recurrence of the issue would be rare, and that Jones' two wives
were pro se litigants, meaning that there likely would be "only limited
assistance from the parties in deciding this issue, which may have
precedential significance beyond the ERISA context." 9
On return, the Second Circuit acknowledged that the Court of
Appeals "properly[] noted that because this dispute arises under
ERISA, it was preferable for us to speak to it first," as "the
designation of the proper beneficiary to a pension plan covered by
ERISA may well be one that is properly resolved by application of
federal, rather than state, law." 240 The court also noted the unrelated
difficulty of the undeveloped record in the case, commenting that "on
the record developed below, we are in no position to make any final
determination, either as to the relevant legal standards or as to their
application to the facts of this case," and remanded the case to the
District Court for fuller factual development.241 After determining
that "the parties have provided all the evidence on the subject that
they can possibly provide," the District Court granted summary
judgment to Jones' first wife, concluding that the absence of evidence
that the first marriage had been dissolved overcame the presumption
that the second marriage was valid.242
Another issue more appropriate for federal resolution arose in Yesil
v. Reno:243 whether the District Director of an Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") detention center in Louisiana was
subject to long-arm jurisdiction in New York, where he had been
named a respondent in two habeas corpus petitions.2" After
describing the New York activities of the INS official related to the
petitioners, the Second Circuit certified two questions:
237. Id. at 578.
238. Grabois v. Jones, 88 N.Y.2d 254, 255 (1996).
239. Id.
240. Grabois v. Jones, 89 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1996).
241. Id. at 100.
242. Grabois v. Jones, No. 94-2070, 1998 WL 158756, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1998).
243. 172 F.3d 39, 1998 WL 667661 (2d Cir. Sept. 18, 1998), certified question
declined in 92 N.Y.2d 455 (1998).
244. See id. at *1.
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(1) What contacts between an Immigration and Naturalization
Service District Director, whose office is located outside the State of
New York and whose district does not encompass the State of New
York, and an alien residing in the State of New York, are sufficient
to bring the District Director within the scope of the New York
long-arm statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) (McKinney 1990)?
(2) On the specific facts of each of the two above mentioned cases,
does personal jurisdiction over District Director Caplinger exist in
New York pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1)?
In declining to answer these questions, the Court of Appeals saw a
boundless potential for "[a]lternative possibilities for obtaining
jurisdiction, flowing from other potential Federal and State
sources."'  Thus, as in Retail Software, the court expressed doubt as
to whether the questions could "be determinative of the underlying
matters."' The court also noted that the questions, which concerned
immigration and naturalization-matters unlikely to arise in state
court proceedings-were better addressed by the federal courts.
Finally, the court was concerned "that a theoretical quality inheres in
the form of the first certified question," which would detract from the
determinative nature of the court's answer.247 On its return to federal
court, the case settled.2"
The Court of Appeals' most recent declination came in Tunick v.
Safir.49 In July of 1999, photographer Spencer Tunick applied for a
permit to conduct a photo shoot of 75 to 100 nude models in a
residential neighborhood in lower Manhattan.25 0 On July 13, 1999,
after the city denied permission, Tunick moved for injunctive relief
preventing interference with a proposed shoot on July 18, 1999.11
Tunick argued that his artistic expression was constitutionally
protected and that the photo shoot fell within the exemption to the
New York statute prohibiting the promotion of public nudity except
for "any person entertaining or performing in a play, exhibition, show
or entertainment. '' 22
245. Yesil, 92 N.Y.2d at 457.
246. Id. at 456-57.
247. Id. at 457; see David D. Siegel, Court of Appeals Rejitses to Answer Two
Questions Certified by Second Circuit, One Because Too Loose and the Other Because
Likely to Arise Only in Federal Court, 470 N.Y. St. L Dig. 1 (Feb. 1999) ("A response
to the question would be like an opinion containing nothing but dicta.... For the
New York Court of Appeals to try to formulate a list of all the possibilities [of
contacts relevant to long-arm jurisdiction] would be unwise, and its answer in any
event a tome.").
248. See Yesil v. Reno, 175 F.3d 287, 288-89 (2d Cir. 1999).
249. 209 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2000), certified question declined in 94 N.Y.2d 709 (2000).
250. Id. at 69.
251. Id.
252. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 245.01, 245.02 (McKinney 2000).
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On July 16, 1999, the District Court granted a preliminary
injunction prohibiting city interference with Tunick's photo shoot.2 53
The following day, the Second Circuit stayed the preliminary
injunction pending its review2 4 On appeal to that court, the city's
sole argument was that the exemption to the ban on public nudity did
not protect Tunick, because it "applies only to performances or
exhibitions that [take] place indoors before audiences."2 5
In a two-to-one decision that prompted writings from each panel
member, the Circuit Court decided to certify three questions to the
Court of Appeals. 6 The questions were:
(1) Whether a photographic shoot involving 75 to 100 nude bodies
arranged in an abstract formation on a public street constitutes
entertainment or performance in a "play, exhibition, show or
entertainment" within the meaning of the exception to N.Y. Pen.
Law § 245.01 and § 245.02.
(2) If the answer to the first question is yes, whether the exceptions
to N.Y. Pen. Law § 245.01 and § 245.02 are limited to indoor
activities.
(3) If the answer to the first question is no, or if the answers to the
first and second questions are both yes, whether N.Y. Pen. Law §
245.01 and § 245.02, so interpreted, are valid under the Constitution
of the State of New York. 7
Second Circuit Judge Guido Calabresi, writing for the panel, noted
that no New York appellate court had examined the statutory
exemption, and the two trial courts that had construed it reached
opposite conclusions regarding whether it applied to the
photographing of nude models.28 Judge Calabresi reviewed the case
law relating to abstention and certification -emphasizing Arizonans's
message "that we should consider certifying in more instances than
had previously been thought appropriate" 9-and found particularly
persuasive the absence of authoritative state court decisions, the
likelihood of the issue's recurrence and the possibility that an
interpretation of the statute would remove federal constitutional
issues from the case and resolve the litigation.2 6 He also found
"distinct federalism concerns" favoring certification, as a recent
253. Tunick, 209 F.3d at 69.
254. Id. at 68.
255. Id. at 71 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
256. The Court's decision was made on its own, not at the request of either party.
Id. at 89 n.18.
257. Id. at 90.
258. See id. at 71 (discussing People v. Gilmore, 120 Misc. 2d 741 (1983) and People
v. Wilhelm, 69 Misc. 2d 523 (1972)).
259. Id. at 73; see supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing Arizonans
for Official English v. Ariz., 520 U.S. 43 (1997)).
260. See Tunick, 209 F.3d at 81-84.
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"heavy stream of First Amendment litigation" similar to Tunick's
created a danger that federal courts were performing crucial local
government functions. 61 In a key passage, however, he observed that
if the delay caused by certifying the questions unacceptably impaired
Tunick's First Amendment fights, the Circuit Court could abort the
process:
[B]ecause we retain jurisdiction over this case... we have the option
of reconsidering the stay that we earlier imposed on the preliminary
injunction should certification impose unexpected delays or should
conditions with respect to the asserted right change. This option
allows us to continue, in the light of evolving circumstances, to
balance the desirability of avoiding needless friction with state
courts and of unnecessary constitutional decision making against the
harm of extended delay in the adjudication of potential First
Amendment rights.2
Judge Robert Sack, concurring, disagreed "because certification in
this case will postpone Tunick's speech indefinitely, and in the realm
of prior restraints on expression I think that such delay, being
unnecessary, is constitutionally intolerable."'  Judge Sack maintained
that "time is always of the essence when it comes to speech," and
would have preferred to lift the stay of the District Court's injunction
and remand the case for that court to re-enter an injunction
preventing the city from interfering with Tunick's photo shoot.26 '
According to Judge Sack, this result would have protected Tunick's
right to engage in his desired expression without further delay,
although it would have placed him at risk of subsequent punishment.
Nevertheless, Judge Sack joined in certification, finding it preferable
to dismissal based on mootness, the alternative proposed by the third
panel member, Judge Ellsworth Van Graafeiland.2-' Judge Sack
beseeched the state Court of Appeals "to be more expeditious in
deciding whether to accept this certification and, if [the court does]
accept it, in deciding the certified questions, than we have been in
deciding to certify them in the first place."'
The state court, in declining, underscored the procedural posture of
the case: a preliminary injunction motion. Although the nature of
plaintiff's claims called for expedited resolution, there already had
been a significant delay between the filing of the complaint and
certification. Immediate resolution was far more likely in the Second
Circuit, where the case had been briefed and argued. Adding to the
complication of delay was the federal court's observation that it could
261. Id. at 85, 87.
262. Id. at 89.
263. Id. at 95.
264. Id. at 96 (emphasis in original).
265. See id.; see also id. at 99-100 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 96 (Sack, J., concurring).
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lift the stay on the preliminary injunction "should certification impose
unexpected delays or should conditions with respect to the asserted
right change. 2 67 If the stay were lifted, the controversy would end.
Thus, the state court noted, "the questions come to us in the unique
posture that, once accepted, they may become moot."2"
Further counseling against acceptance was the third certified
question-a state constitutional issue not raised, briefed or argued by
the parties. The state court noted that it "could not responsibly
engage on that question where the parties to the litigation have not
sought relief under this State's Constitution and the issue would be
first briefed and raised in our Court. '269 Because the constitutional
question was material to the federal court's decision to certify, the fact
that the question could not be reached was part of the "confluence of
factors" leading the court to decline.7"
One week after the state court declined the questions, the Second
Circuit dissolved the stay and remanded so the District Court could
re-enter the injunction prohibiting interference with the photo
shoot.27 Precisely two weeks later, on June 4, 2000, the shoot took
place on a closed-off stretch of Delancey Street under the
Williamsburg Bridge in New York City. One hundred fifty-two
models posed nude during the fifteen minutes allowed by the District
Court for the photograph.272
3. Questions Not Asked
As with cases in which the state court has declined to answer, it is
instructive to examine cases in which federal courts have declined to
ask. Obviously, it is far more difficult to gather cases where courts
have passed up certification, and often impossible to know why,
because they rarely explain why such a request was not made. The
following examples, however, offer some insight into the subject.
McCarthy v. Olin Corp.273 is the most explicit example of a question
not asked. The case arose out of the Long Island Railroad massacre
267. Id. at 89; see also SG Cowen Secs. Corp. v. Messih, 2000 WL 1174969, at *7 n.1
(2d Cir. Aug. 18, 2000) (citing Tunick v. Safir, and declining to certify question
because certification not deemed feasible in light of need for expedition).
268. Tunick v. Safir, 94 N.Y.2d 709, 711 (2000).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 712. Once again, in declining the questions, the court underscored the
great value in New York's certification procedure, noting that it "can provide the
requesting court with timely, authoritative answers to open questions of New York
law, facilitating the orderly development and fair application of the law and
preventing the need for speculation." Id. at 711-12.
271. See Tunick v. Safir, No. 99-7823, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11088 (2d Cir. May
19, 2000).
272. See Shaila K. Dewan, Live! Nude! And Legal! Artist Gets his Naked Photo,
N.Y. Times, June 5, 2000, at B3.
273. 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997).
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of December 7, 1993, in which Colin Ferguson opened fire on a busy
commuter train, killing six people and wounding nineteen. Ferguson's
nine millimeter handgun was loaded with Olin's "Black Talon"
bullets, which have unusually great wounding power. Although these
bullets were originally designed for law enforcement agencies, they
were briefly made available to the general public. Plaintiffs, two
survivors and the estate of one deceased victim of the shooting, sued
Olin in state court, alleging causes of action in negligence and strict
products liability. The case was removed to the Southern District,
where Olin successfully sought dismissal for failure to state a claim.
On appeal, plaintiffs urged reinstatement or, in the alternative,
certification of the novel questions of New York law raised by their
complaint to the state Court of Appeals.
The Circuit Court declined to certify, determining that although the
state Court of Appeals had not yet addressed the issue of ammunition
manufacturer liability, "existing precedents in New York law...
provide us with sufficient guidance to analyze the district court's
dismissal of this case." 274 In particular, the court pointed to opinions
of two New York lower courts that had dismissed claims against Olin
for the manufacture and marketing of Black Talon bullets. Relying on
these cases, as well as other New York precedents regarding design
defects, inherently dangerous products and duty, the federal court
affirmed dismissal of the complaint. 275
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Calabresi vigorously urged certification.
In his view, the case was "less about bullets than about federal/state
relations," raising "important questions of when it is appropriate for
this court to certify issues of New York law to the New York Court of
Appeals."26 He opined that "federal courts in general, and this circuit
in particular, have tended to be far too reluctant to certify questions to
the state courts," especially in the presence of on-point state lower
court opinions.27 Judge Calabresi characterized this reluctance as
"both wrong and unjust," promoting forum shopping and creating
anomalies when a federal court's decision is different from what a
state court's would have been.28 As for the claims themselves, he
found significant open questions regarding both duty and defect,
274. Id. at 154.
275. See id. at 153-57 (citing Forni v. Ferguson, 232 A.D.2d 176 (1st Dep't 1996)
and Perkarski v. Donovan, Nos. 95-11161, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oneida County Sept.
27, 1995)).
276. Id. at 157 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
277. Id.
27& Id. at 157-59. According to Judge Calabresi, forum shopping when there is
authority in the intermediate state courts, but not the state high court, will frequently
lead to a funneling of all similar litigation into federal court. -If the federal court
treats the plaintiff more favorably than the state tribunal would, then the plaintiff
always files in federal court; similarly any departure in the manufacturer's favor leads
the defendant to remove any suit filed in state court." Id. at 158 (Calabresi, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Todd v. Socidtd BIC, S.A., 9 F.3d 1216, 1222 (7th Cir. 1993)).
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involving policy choices appropriate only for the state's highest
tribunal.
In DeWeerth v. Baldinger,279 the Second Circuit again chose not to
certify. At issue there was whether a person claiming ownership of
stolen personal property was required to use due diligence to locate
the property in order to toll the statute of limitations for a subsequent
suit against a good-faith purchaser. A Monet painting had been stolen
from plaintiff's German residence in 1945, and during the next twelve
years plaintiff unsuccessfully tried to locate the work. She took no
action, however, from 1957 until 1982, when her nephew found
documentation of the painting's 1957 sale by a New York art dealer.
After a state trial court ordered the dealer to identify the painting's
owner, plaintiff demanded its return. The owner, who had purchased
the painting in good faith in 1957, refused.
Two weeks later, plaintiff filed suit in the Southern District of New
York, which ruled that plaintiff "had superior title and that the action
was timely as she had exercised reasonable diligence in finding [it]."280
On appeal, the parties hotly contested the timeliness of the action, in
particular whether plaintiff had an obligation to use due diligence in
attempting to locate the property. Although noting that the issue was
"interesting," the Second Circuit declined certification, believing that
the issue would not "recur with sufficient frequency to warrant use" of
the procedure."8 Resolving the issue itself, the Second Circuit held
that "under New York law an owner's obligation to make a demand
without unreasonable delay includes an obligation to use due
diligence to locate stolen property." m  The court concluded that
plaintiff had not exercised due diligence and dismissed her claim as
time barred.
In fact, the issue recurred several times in the years following
DeWeerth, ultimately reaching the state Court of Appeals in Solomon
R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell.28 The work at issue in Lubell, a
Chagall gouache worth an estimated $200,000, had been stolen from
the Guggenheim museum by a mail room employee in the late 1960s.
Rachel Lubell and her husband purchased the painting from a gallery
in 1967, and had no reason to believe it was stolen until the museum
demanded its return in 1986. The trial court granted Lubell's motion
to dismiss the action as time barred, relying on DeWeerth's reasonable
efforts requirement. The intermediate appellate court dismissed the
statute of limitations defense and held that any lack of diligence by
279. 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988).
280. Id. at 106 (citing DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 658 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
281. Id. at 108 n.5. The court did not state whether certification was raised by a
party or sua sponte.
282. Id. at 110.
283. 77 N.Y.2d 311 (1991).
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the museum was relevant only to Lubell's laches defense.' The state
Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the only factors relevant to the
statute of limitations defense were the timing of the museum's
demand for the gouache and the Lubells' refusal to return it. Thus,
the Second Circuit's prediction that New York would require a
showing of reasonable diligence in order to toll the Statute of
Limitations proved incorrect.
Recently, the state Court of Appeals settled a vexing issue
regarding malicious prosecution actions that the federal court chose
not to certify three years earlier. In New York, a plaintiff in a
malicious prosecution action bears the burden of demonstrating
favorable termination of the underlying criminal action. Until this
year, the state high court had not decided whether the dismissal of a
criminal action for failure to satisfy speedy trial requirements2
should be considered a favorable termination for malicious
prosecution purposes. Faced with that very question in Murphy v.
Lynn,'s the Second Circuit acknowledged that the issue was open
before the state Court of Appeals, but noted that "[t]he intermediate
state appellate courts considering that question... have generally
concluded that such dismissals are favorable to the accused," as had
several other jurisdictions.m The federal court saw "no reason to
infer that the New York Court of Appeals would adopt a different
view," and chose not to certify.m
When the issue reached the state Court of Appeals three years
later, the answer proved to be less clear than the Murphy court had
believed.39° Indeed, in Smith-Hunter v. Harvey,"9' both the trial and
intermediate appellate courts had concluded that under existing Court
of Appeals precedents, dismissal of a criminal action did not, as a
matter of law, constitute favorable termination for purposes of a
subsequent malicious prosecution action. The state high court,
however, reversed, and distinguished its own recent precedents
"implying that a dismissal, in order to qualify as a favorable
284. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 153 A.D.2d 143 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1990).
285. See, ag., MacFawn v. Kresler, 88 N.Y.2d 859, 860 (1996) (holding that
dismissal of grand larceny charge against an employee due to insufficient evidence did
not constitute termination in favor of employee for purposes of malicious prosecution
action against employer).
286. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 30.30 (McKinney 1992) (providing for dismissal of
a criminal prosecution if the state is not ready for trial within specified time periods).
287. 118 F.3d 938 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1115 (1998).
288. Id. at 949-50.
289. Id. at 950. The court did not state whether either party requested certification.
290. Before the state Court of Appeals ultimately decided the issue, other federal
courts cited Murphy in deciding the same question. See, eg., Posr v. Court Officers
Shield #207, 180 F.3d 409, 417-18 (2d Cir. 1999); Kurschus v. Painewebber, Inc., 16 F.
Supp. 2d 386,392-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
291. 2000 WL 893310 (N.Y. July 6,2000).
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termination, must affirmatively indicate the innocence of the
accused. ' '2 2 The court rejected application of this principle in Smith-
Hunter, as it would bar a malicious prosecution plaintiff whose
criminal case had been dismissed for lack of merit, and could force a
person to waive speedy trial rights in order to preserve a civil remedy.
Instead, because no further prosecution of plaintiff was possible after
the speedy trial dismissal, and there were no circumstances
surrounding the dismissal inconsistent with plaintiff's innocence, the
dismissal was adequate to demonstrate a termination favorable to
plaintiff. Unlike the federal court in Murphy, which established a
presumption that speedy trial dismissals should generally be
considered favorable to the accused, the state court in Smith-Hunter
simply held that the dismissal in that case was not inconsistent with
plaintiff's innocence.293 Thus, three years after the federal court's
prediction in Murphy, the state court in Smith-Hunter both settled and
clarified the law in this area.294
C. Lessons Learned From New York's Experience with Certification
The New York experience has shown beyond dispute that inter-
jurisdictional certification is beneficial to state and federal courts and
litigants. In cases where it has been used, it has effectively addressed
the difficulty of determining open state law issues in federal
litigation-which has troubled courts since Erie Railroad Co. v.
292. Id. at *5.
293. Id. at *6.
294. The Second Circuit has discussed its decision not to certify in several
additional cases. In Lazard Freres & Co. v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 108 F.3d 1531 (2d
Cir. 1997), the court noted that the defendant, who disagreed with the court's choice-
of-law holding, was the party that had removed the case to federal court in the first
place, and that neither party asked the court to certify the question to the state high
court. Id. at 1541 n.8. Furthermore, whether New York's tort or contract choice of
law rules applied-the question at issue-the Second Circuit concluded it was likely
that New York law governed the dispute. In Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.
1988), the Second Circuit decided not to certify to the Connecticut Supreme Court
the meaning of a statute subject to a constitutional challenge for vagueness and
overbreadth, as it concluded the statute was not reasonably susceptible to a limiting
interpretation. Id. at 434-36. In Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 783 F.2d 285 (2d
Cir. 1986), the case was in an advanced procedural stage when the certification
procedure became effective. The court stated: "[W]e have determined not to seek to
avail ourselves of the procedure in this case, happy as we are to have it available in
the future." Id. at 294 n.9. Most recently, the Second Circuit addressed its decision
not to certify a question to the New York State Court of Appeals in two cases.
Goodlett v. Kalishek, 2000 WL 1056066, at *6-9 (2d Cir. Aug. 1, 2000) (Feinberg, J.,
dissenting) ("I see no persuasive reason why, in a situation where the stakes are high
and the law is arguably unclear, we should not try to make sure we properly
understand New York law before proceeding further."); SG Cowen Secs. Corp. v.
Messih, 2000 WL 1174969, at *7 n.1 (2d Cir. Aug. 18, 2000) (finding that certification
was not feasible in light of need for prompt resolution).
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Tompkins29 -by eliminating federal court guesswork and allowing
state high courts to settle state law authoritatively.
Evidencing the success of certification, nearly every state has
adopted the procedure, and both state and federal judges throughout
the nation have given it high marks.29 Widespread experience has
mooted the question whether the procedure works; clearly it does.
More significant today is the question of how to optimize its use.
With many successes and a few missteps under their belts, New York
courts and litigants now have a healthy start on answering that
question.
Assuming the baseline requirements for certification are met-
meaning the question is open before the state high court and
potentially determinative of the federal litigation-experience has
shown that the procedure works best with uncluttered questions of
common law or state statutory interpretation that are likely to recur.
Certification has had its greatest value where a policy choice among
reasonable alternatives-the province of the state high court-is
implicated, whether in the reading of a statute or the evolution of a
common law principle. Issues involving the application of settled law
to particular facts, issues that are primarily federal in nature and
issues not raised by the parties themselves have proven inappropriate
for certification. Furthermore, the delay and cost involved have
rendered the procedure unattractive when time-sensitive
extraordinary relief is sought, when the issue is unlikely to recur or
when the issue is already independently working its way through the
state appellate system. Courts also have been disinclined to use the
procedure when the party seeking certification invoked federal
jurisdiction, as the voluntary election of a federal forum for factual
determinations and simultaneous desire to have state court
determination of the key legal issue may be viewed as wasteful, and
worse.
297
295. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
296. See Carroll Seron, Federal Judicial Center, Certifying Questions of State Law.
Experience of Federal Judges 10 (1983) (reporting that eighty-four percent of judges
surveyed found the procedure to be "extremely useful," and seventy-six percent gave
it a "very positive" rating); Corr & Robbins, supra note 28, at 457 (noting that judges
surveyed "indicated overwhelming judicial support for the certification process");
Goldschmidt, supra note 73, at 110 (judges highly satisfied with certification).
Nevertheless, like most things in life, certification also has its critics. See, eg., Selya,
supra note 145, at 691 (arguing that certification has been ineffective in meeting its
goals while adding to the time and cost of litigation); Yonover, supra note 31, at 316-
17 (noting past criticisms of certification process and proposing procedural
limitations).
297. See, e.g., Lazard Freres & Co., 108 F.3d at 1541 n.8 (noting in declining to
certify that defendant, who disagreed with its holding, had removed the case to
federal court); Tidier v. Eli Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(commenting that plaintiffs' choice of a federal forum "is not helpful to their request
for certification"); Smigiel v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 785 F.2d 922,924 (11th Cir. 1986)
("[T]his court is struck by an amazing irony. Aetna, which now prays for an opinion
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The way in which courts have presented certified questions has
been essential to optimal use of the procedure. While certification
requests in New York began with a mere three paragraphs in Kidney
v. Kolmar98 and four in Rufino v. United States,99 it is now standard
practice for a certifying court to supply a full description of the facts
and reasons why certification is appropriate."° Such explication has
been beneficial in enabling the state court to make an informed
decision on whether to accept the certification and how to resolve the
case.301  Because determinativeness is required by the -state
constitution and both courts' rules-and twice contributed to the
rejection of certified questions-federal court discussions of the ways
in which questions "will control the outcome" of the case have also
been valuable."° By the same token, full state court explanations in
the few instances when it has declined questions have helped
certifying courts to avoid similar pitfalls in the future.
Further assisting the process has been the development of some
degree of flexibility for both the asking and answering courts. The
New York state court has, on a few occasions, reframed questions in
order to make them more readily answerable and to remove
abstractness, ambiguity or other obstacles that may not have been
apparent at the time of certification.3  Moreover, experience has
from a Florida court, petitioned to remove the case from the jurisdiction of the state
courts."); Smith v. FCX, Inc., 744 F.2d 1378, 1379 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting that because
plaintiff filed suit in federal court, his request for certification "comes with little
grace"); Cantwell v. Univ. of Mass., 551 F.2d 879, 880 (1st Cir. 1977) ("[T]he bar
should take notice that one who chooses the federal courts in diversity actions is in a
peculiarly poor position to seek certification. We do not look favorably, either on
trying to take two bites at the cherry by applying to the state court after failing to
persuade the federal court, or on duplicating judicial effort."); Yonover, supra note
31, at 325-59.
298. No. 86-7194, slip op. (2d Cir. July 7, 1986).
299. No. 86-6175, slip op. (2d Cir. Jan. 21, 1987).
300. See Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. BDO Seidman, LLP, Nos. 99-7719(L), 99-
7720(C), 2000 WL 713909 (2d Cir. June 5,2000); Green v. Montgomery, No. 99-7515,
2000 WL 674757 (2d Cir. May 24, 2000); Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2000);
Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing & Publ'g, 175 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 1999).
301. Indeed, the importance of a fully developed record was a key reason why the
constitutional amendment permitting certification does not allow the state court to
accept questions from federal trial courts. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
302. N.Y. Ct. R. § 0.27 (2d Cir.) (McKinney 2000).
303. See, e.g., Engel v. CBS, Inc., 93 N.Y.2d 195, 199 (1999) (clarifying the certified
question to make it more answerable); In re Southeast Banking Corp. v. First Trust of
N.Y., 93 N.Y.2d 178 (1999) (same). The question posed in Southeast Banking Corp.,
156 F.3d 1114 (11th Cir. 1998)-which asked for "any language" that could alert a
junior creditor to its assumption of the risk-called for a potentially endless litany of
relevant language. Id. at 1125. Thus, the state court recast the question, "within the
procedural boundaries" of the certification. Southeast Banking Corp, 93 N.Y.2d at
181. Two questions sent by the Second Circuit in Wildenstein & Co., Inc. v. Wallis,
949 F.2d 632 (2d Cir. 1991) also were recast. The questions asked in general whether
"the New York Rule Against Perpetuities applies to preemptive rights and future
consignment interests in personal property," and whether "the New York common
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shown that meaningful answers may ultimately require the state court
to address matters not directly presented by the certification request.
The Second Circuit has been sensitive to this fact, and several times
explicitly invited the state court, if it so desired, to consider additional
state law issues related to the questions.'
The entanglement of related issues has proved especially
problematic when a statute to be interpreted by the state court is also
the subject of a federal constitutional challenge. In these
circumstances -where Pullman abstention once reigned- certification
may present difficulties if the state law issue is presented in a vacuum,
simply as a matter of statutory interpretation. Ordinarily, a state
court must consider the statute in the context of the constitutional
challenge in order to avoid constitutional infirmity to the extent
possible. The problems that can arise when the context is not
provided were illustrated in Retail Sofrvare v. Lashlee,'  where the
state court was asked whether a particular statute provided a basis for
personal jurisdiction, but was not presented with the constitutional
defense mounted in federal court based on a lack of minimal contacts.
Had the state court answered the question as posed-which it did
not-it would have had to assume constitutionality, an assumption
that may well have been unfounded in the eyes of the federal court.3
law rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation invalidates preemptive rights
and future consignment interests in personal property." Id. at 636. Answers to the
questions as written would merely have set forth general propositions and would not
have determined whether the particular agreement at issue was invalid. The state
Court of Appeals recognized, however, that the questions "must be construed in the
context of the real case in controversy in order to provide meaningful and appropriate
answers." Wildenstein & Co. v. Wallis, 79 N.Y.2d 641, 645 (1992).
304. See, eg., Madden v. Creative Servs., Inc., 24 F.3d 394 (2d Cir. 1994):
Though certifying to the Court of Appeals the questions as framed above,
we also wish to make clear that we have no desire to restrict the Court of
Appeals from considering any state law issues that it might wish to resolve in
connection with this appeal. Therefore, though our immediate request is for
answers to the questions as framed, we would welcome any guidance the
Court of Appeals might care to provide us with respect to any state law
issues presented by this appeal.
Id. at 397.
For similar statements, see also Sec. Investor Prot., 2000 WL 713909, at *18; Green,
2000 WL 674757, at *8; Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. ABB Power Generation Inc., 112 F.3d
70,73 (2d Cir. 1997); Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Creative Hous. Ltd., 70 F.3d 720,
723-24 (2d Cir. 1995); West-Fair Elec. Contractors v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 49 F.3d
48, 51 (2d Cir. 1995); Consorti v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 45 F.3d 48, 51 (2d
Cir. 1995).
305. 71 N.Y.2d 788 (1988).
306. This problem is, of course, not unique to New York. For examples from
Massachusetts, see Herbert P. Wilkins, Certification of Questions of Law: The
Massachusetts Experience, 74 Mass. L. Rev. 256, 257 (1989) (noting that two cases in
which federal courts certified issues of statutory construction but not the -associated
constitutional questions placed [Massachusetts'] Supreme Judicial Court in an
awkward position" because that court tried to save the statutes to the extent
constitutionally permissible).
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One possible solution to this dilemma is for certifications to set out
the constitutional issues, and for such issues to be briefed and argued.
Because the parties ultimately will have to present the constitutional
issues to the federal court-indeed, they may already have done so
before certification-the additional burden should be minimal, and
the benefits should justify the costs. If the state court is not fully
informed of the constitutional challenges, it is placed in the
unenviable position of either denying certification or attempting to
interpret a statute to avoid unknown constitutional challenges, and
may reach a different result than it would if the constitutional
challenges were presented. Thus, in these circumstances, the salutary
effects of certification could be substantially undermined.
CONCLUSION
During these past fifteen years in New York, inter-jurisdictional
certification has proved itself a valuable tool for the efficient, orderly
development of state law when unresolved questions arise in federal
litigation. Wholly apart from its contributions to the substantive law,
the procedure has enabled state and federal courts to speak openly to
one another in the resolution of cases that concern them both, thereby
promoting a cooperative federalism that independent court systems
and overflowing dockets do not ordinarily permit. We can only
conclude that these benefits will be multiplied in the years ahead, as
still greater use is made of the certification procedure.
APPENDIX A
The state inter-jurisdictional certification statutes and rules are:
Ala. R. App. P. 18; Alaska R. App. P. 407; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
12-1861 (West 1994); Ariz. Sup. Ct. R. 27; Cal. R. Ct. 29.5; Colo. App.
R. 21.1; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 51-199a (West 1997); Conn. R. App.
P. §§ 82-1 to -7; Del. Const. art. IV, § 11(8); Del. Sup. Ct. R. 41; D.C.
Code Ann. § 11-723 (1981 & Supp. 1987); Fla. Const. art. V, § 3(b)(6);
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 25.031 (West 1998); Fla. R. App. P. 9.150; Ga. Code
Ann. § 15-2-9 (1999); Ga. R. Sup. Ct. 46; Haw. R. App. P. 13; Idaho
App. R. 12.1; Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 20; Ind. Code Ann. § 33-2-4-1 (Michie
1998); Ind. R. App. P. 15(0); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 684A.1-.11 (West
1998); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-3201 to -3212 (1994); Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.37;
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:72.1 (West 1999); La. Sup. Ct. R. XII; Me. R.
Civ. P. 76B; Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 12-601 to -609
(1998); Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. R. 1:03; Mich. Ct. R. 7.305; Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 480.065 (West Supp. 2000); Miss. R. App. P. 20; Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 477.004 (West Supp. 2000) (held unconstitutional by Grantham v.
Mo. Dep't of Corrs., No. 72576, 1990 WL 602159, at *1 (Mo. Jul. 13,
1990)); Mont. R. App. P. 44; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-219 to -225 (1997);
Nev. R. App. P. 5; N.H. Sup. Ct. R. 34; N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 39-7-1 to 7-
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10 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1999); N.M. R. App. P. 12-607; N.Y. Ct. R. §
500.17; N.D. R. App. P. 47; Ohio Sup. Ct. Prac. R. XVIII; Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 20, §§ 1601-11 (West 1991); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 28.200-.255
(1997); Or. R. App. P. 12.20; In re: Certification of Questions of Law,
No. 197 Judicial Administration Docket No. 1 (Penn. Sup. Ct. Jan. 12,
2000); R.I. Sup. Ct. R. 6; S.C. App. Ct. R. 228; S.D. Codified Laws §§
15-24A-1 (Michie 1994); S.D. S. Ct. R. 85-7; Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 23; Tex.
R. App. P. 74 (Tex. Crim. App.); Tex. R. App. P. 58; Utah R. App. P.
41; Va. R. Sup. Ct. 5:42; Wash. Rev. Code §§ 2.60.010-60.900 (West
1998); Wash. R. App. P. 16.16; W. Va. Code §§ 51-1A-1 to -12 (1994);
Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 821.01-.12 (West 1994); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-13-106
(Michie 1994); Wyo. R. App. P. 11.01-.07.
The high courts of Washington, D.C. and Puerto Rico may also
accept certified questions. See D.C. R. Ct. App. R. 54; P.R. Sup. Ct. R.
27.
APPENDIX B
The forty-four certified questions sent to the New York Court of
Appeals, and their subsequent history, are as follows:
Kidney v. Kolmar Labs., Inc., No. 86-7194 (2d Cir. July 7, 1986); 68
N.Y.2d 343 (1986); 808 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1987).
Rufino v. United States, No. 86-6175 (2d Cir. Jan. 21, 1987); 69
N.Y.2d 310 (1987) (certification declined); 829 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1987).
Loengard v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., No. 86-7682 (2d Cir. Jan. 28,
1987); 70 N.Y.2d 262 (1987).
Retail Software Servs., Inc. v. Lashlee, 838 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1988);
71 N.Y.2d 788 (1988); 854 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1988) (certification
declined).
Home Ins. Co. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 873 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.
1989); 75 N.Y.2d 196 (1990); 902 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir. 1990).
Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc. v. Lloyd's Syndicate 317, 902
F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1990); sub nom Landoil Res. Corp. v. Alexander &
Alexander Servs., Inc., 77 N.Y.2d 28 (1990); sub nom Alexander &
Alexander Servs., Inc. v. Lloyd's Syndicate 317, 925 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.
1990).
Banque Worms v. BankAmerica Int'l, No. 90-7106 (2d Cir. May 30,
1990); 77 N.Y.2d 362 (1991); 928 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1991).
Ass'n of Surrogates & Supreme Court Reporters v. State of New
York, No. 90-9036 (2d Cir. Mar. 21, 1991); 78 N.Y.2d 143 (1991); 966
F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1992).
Wildenstein & Co., Inc. v. Wallis, 949 F.2d 632 (2d Cir. 1991); 79
N.Y.2d 641 (1992); 983 F.2d 1047, No. 91-7254 (2d Cir. Nov, 12, 1992).
Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 949 F.2d 630 (2d Cir.
1991); 79 N.Y.2d 576 (1992); 4 F.3d 1049 (2d Cir. 1993).
Hertz Corp. v. City of New York, 967 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1992); 80
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N.Y.2d 565 (1992); 1 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 1993).
Gonzales v. Armac Indus., Ltd., 970 F.2d 1123 (2d Cir. 1992); 81
N.Y.2d 1 (1993); 990 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1993).
Riordan v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1992);
984 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1993) (certification withdrawn before decision by
the Court of Appeals).
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. New York City Transit Auth., 990 F.2d
76 (2d Cir. 1993); 82 N.Y.2d 47 (1993); 14 F.3d 818 (2d Cir. 1994).
Longway v. Jefferson County Bd. of Supervisors, 995 F.2d 12 (2d
Cir. 1993); 83 N.Y.2d 17 (1993); 24 F.3d 397 (2d Cir. 1994).
Bocre Leasing Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 20 F.3d 66 (2d Cir.
1994); 84 N.Y.2d 685 (1995).
Madden v. Creative Servs., Inc., 24 F.3d 394 (2d Cir. 1994); 84
N.Y.2d 738 (1995); 51 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1995).
Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 42 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1994); 87 N.Y.2d 248
(1995); 79 F.3d 12 (2d Cir. 1996).
Consorti v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 45 F.3d 48 (2d Cir.
1995); 86 N.Y.2d 449 (1995); sub nom Consorti v. Armstrong World
Indus., Inc., 72 F.3d 1003 (2d Cir. 1995).
West-Fair Elec. Contractors v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 49 F.3d 48 (2d
Cir. 1995); 87 N.Y.2d 148 (1995); 78 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1996).
Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. &
Cmty. Renewal, No. 94-7677 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 1995); 87 N.Y.2d 325
(1995); 83 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 1996).
Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Creative Hous. Ltd., 70 F.3d 720 (2d
Cir. 1995); 88 N.Y.2d 347 (1996); 93 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1996).
M.J.F.M. Kools v. Citibank, N.A., 73 F.3d 5 (2d Cir. 1995), No. 95-
7209 (2d Cir. Aug. 5, 1996) (certification withdrawn before decision by
the Court of Appeals).
Grabois v. Jones, 77 F.3d 574 (2d Cir. 1996); 88 N.Y.2d 254 (1996);
89 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 1996) (certification declined).
Norcon Power Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 110
F.3d 6 (2d Cir. 1997); 92 N.Y.2d 458 (1998); 163 F.3d 153 (2d Cir.
1998).
Ins. Co. of N. America v. ABB Power Generation, Inc., 112 F.3d 70
(2d Cir. 1997); 91 N.Y.2d 180 (1997).
Rooney v. Tyson, 127 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 1997); 91 N.Y.2d 685 (1998).
Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 132 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 1998); 92 N.Y.2d 232
(1998); 170 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1999).
Joblon v. Solow, 135 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 1998); 91 N.Y.2d 457 (1998);
152 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1998).
Royal Indem. Co. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., No. 97-7301 (2d Cir.
Mar. 6, 1998); 92 N.Y.2d 653 (1998); 172 F.3d 38, 1999 WL 43699 (2d
Cir. Jan. 8, 1999).
Great N. Ins. Co. v. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 143 F.3d 659 (2d
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Cir. 1998); 92 N.Y.2d 682 (1999); 170 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 1999).
Engel v. CBS, Inc., 145 F.3d 499 (2d Cir. 1998); 93 N.Y.2d 195
(1999); 182 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 1999).
Messner Vetere Berger McNamee Schmetterer Euro RSCG Inc. v.
Aegis Group PLC, 150 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1998); 93 N.Y.2d 229 (1999);
186 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 1999).
Tanges v. Heidelberg N. America, Inc., No. 97-9312 (2d Cir. July 17,
1998); 93 N.Y.2d 48 (1999); 173 F.3d 846, 1999 WL 278694 (2d Cir.
May 3, 1999).
Yesil v. Reno, 172 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1998); 92 N.Y.2d 455 (1998); 175
F.3d 287 (2d Cir. 1999) (certification declined).
Southeast Banking Corp. v. First Trust of N.Y., 156 F.3d 1114 (11th
Cir. 1998); 93 N.Y.2d 178 (1999); 179 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 1999).
Argentina v. Emery World Wide Delivery Corp., 161 F.3d 108 (2d
Cir. 1998); 93 N.Y.2d 554 (1999); 188 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 1999).
Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing & Publ'g, 175 F.3d 262 (2d Cir.
1999); 94 N.Y.2d 436 (2000); 208 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2000).
Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2000); 94 N.Y.2d 709 (2000);
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11088 (2d Cir. May 19, 2000) (certification
declined).
Green v. Montgomery, 2000 WL 674757 (2d Cir. May 24, 2000)
(awaiting briefing and argument).
Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 2000 WL 713909
(2d Cir. June 5, 2000) (awaiting briefing and argument).
Rangolan v. County of Nassau, 2000 WL 777952 (2d Cir. June 15,
2000) (awaiting briefing and argument).
Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., 2000 WL 1160699 (2d Cir. Aug.
16,2000) (awaiting briefing and argument).
Gelb v. Bd. Of Elections of City of N.Y., 2000 WL 1189866 (2d Cir.
Aug. 22,2000) (awaiting briefing and argument).
Darby v. Compagnie Nat'l, No. 99-7848 (2d Cir. Sept. 18, 2000)
(request pending).
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